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U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
AND THE TRADITIONAL NUCLEAR
CONCEPTION OF FAMILY:
TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION OF
FAMILY THAT PROTECTS CHILDREN'S
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Shani M. King*
Although the paramount purpose of United States
immigration law is not to protect the integrity of family,' U.S.
immigration law does explicitly aim to do so in certain circumstances.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) includes family
reunification provisions, for example, which allow United States
citizens and lawful permanent residents to petition for family
members who live in other countries to join them in the United
States. Even the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), often described as a draconian
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Brown University. I would like to thank Jacqueline Bhabha, Gabriela Ruiz, and
Barbara Woodhouse for valuable insight throughout the process of writing this
Article. I would also like to thank Adriana Camarena, Jeanne Cassin, Beth
Dwyer, Eric Giroux and Rebecca Landy for outstanding research assistance. In
addition, I am grateful to Martha Minow for her mentorship and support.
1. Protecting family integrity is not the paramount purpose of U.S.
immigration law. On the contrary, the United States is often criticized for
destroying families. See, e.g., Bryan Lonegan, American Diaspora: Deportation of
Lawful Residents from the United States and the Destruction of Their Families,
32 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 55 (2007) (discussing the deportation of lawful
permanent residents and the effects these deportations have on families). The
scope of this Article does not include situations in which U.S. immigration law
does not explicitly provide for the protection of family integrity.
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2 ,statute, technically allows otherwise removable "aliens"3 to remain
in the United States if removal would result in "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to the alien's [U.S. citizen or resident]
spouse, parent, or child."4
But even where the United States aims to further family
unity, it fails to do so because U.S. immigration law reflects a legal
construction of the "family" concept that is largely premised on
biology, is grounded in the traditional conception of a nuclear family,
and excludes what this Article calls "functional" families: formations
which may not satisfy this narrow conception of family, but satisfy
the care-taking needs of children.5 By excluding functional families,
2. See, e.g., Robert Pauw, Plenary Power: An Outmoded Doctrine That
Should Not Limit IIRIRA Reform, 51 Emory L. J. 1095, 1095 (2002) (describing
the measures adopted by the IIRIRA as "draconian by any standard").
3. The word "alien" is placed in quotes because it has objectionable
connotations, but it is a term of art in immigration law. See Michele R. Pistone &
Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 16 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 1, 12 n.64 (2001) (discussing the choice to use the term "alien" in
their article and the objectionable connotations of this term); Kevin R. Johnson,
"Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of
Nonpersons, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 263 (1996-97) (arguing that the term
reinforces nativist sentiment towards new immigrants).
4. 8 U.S.C § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006). Notwithstanding this provision,
scholars have noted that the qualifications to this statute are so extreme that is
virtually impossible to use it to prevent deportation on the basis of family unity.
See, e.g., Jeffery S. Lubbers, Holes in the Fence: Immigration Reform and Border
Security in the United States, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 621, 625 (noting that the IIRIRA
"cut to the bone" the possibility of discretionary relief on the basis of family unity
by, inter alia, imposing a standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship-a standard that few applicants are able to meet").
5. The concept of "functional family" has been widely discussed in legal
scholarship, including a seminal and widely cited note in the Harvard Law
Review. Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional
Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1640 (1991)
(exploring the functionalist response to the pervasiveness of the traditional
nuclear family in U.S. law). See, e.g., J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child 12-15 (2d ed. 1979) (noting that children define
family by the caretaking functions adults play in their lives and therefore
functional families can take various forms); Monique Lee Hawthorne, Comment,
Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening the Scope of"Family," 11 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 809, 811 (2007) (arguing that the United States should follow
Canada's lead and adopt broader statutory definitions of family in the
immigration context to better effectuate its policy of family reunification);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What You Mean by Home":
Toward a Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional" Family, 1996 Utah L.
Rev. 569, 579-80 (1996) (arguing that the United States should support
variations of the traditional family form that "not only correspond[ I to what most
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individuals experience as the core of family life, but also respond[ I to societal
interests in fostering interlocking and self-renewing networks of care"); Janet L.
Dolgin, Just A Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. Rev.
637, 637 (1993) (analyzing judicial decisions which indicate attempts to preserve
traditional families while also beginning to alter fundamental assumptions about
what makes families families); Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and
Who's Out, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 269, 276 (1991) (expressing reservations about the
use of the functional family approach); Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-expressing
Parenthood, 98 Yale L. J. 293, 294-95 (1988) (arguing for a conception of
parenthood that is less focused on biology and individual rights and more focused
on relationships and responsibility); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The
Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like
Individuals, 53 Md. L. Rev. 359, 362-63 (1994) (promoting recognition of a child's
liberty interest in relationships with parent like figures); David D. Meyer, Self-
Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 845
(2002) (arguing "that the Court's experience defining 'religion' under the First
Amendment provides a model for allowing a wider-though not unbounded-role
for self-definition of family in constitutional law"); Naomi Cahn, Perfect
Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 Duke L.J. 1077, 1166 (2003) ("But simply
legalizing through assimilation a functional parent-child relationship is
inadequate. The law must also respect the particular characteristics of each such
relationship."); Sarah H. Ramsey, Constructing Parenthood for Stepparents:
Parents by Estoppel and De Facto Parents under the American Law Institute's
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 285, 286
(2001) ('[TIhe attention paid to functional, rather than formal, relationships [is]
in accord with feminist concepts. Feminists may disagree, however, about
whether the Principles give sufficient control to the primary caretaker parent and
about the status of children."); Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18
Harv. Women's L.J. 19, 20 (1995) (criticizing the elevation of the nuclear family
and the consequent evaluation and stigmatization of other family structures);
Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 683, 687 (2001) (arguing that the parental rights doctrine is
better than any alterative standard and that it actually serves to protect the most
vulnerable populations); Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and
Other Nontraditional Families, 78 Geo. L.J. 459, 464, 468-73 (1990) (advocating
for courts to adopt a functional definition of parents in the context of lesbian
couples where mothers have formed parent-like attachments); David Meade,
Consortium Rights of the Unmarried: Time for a Reappraisal, 15 Fain. L. Q. 223,
248-51 (1981) (arguing courts should grant legal benefits to adults based on
functional standards, such as stability, instead of the satisfaction of formal
marriage requirements); Martha A. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual
Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 177-93 (1995) (stating that "the
traditional concept of the nuclear family that underlies the common-law idea of
'family privacy' seems so embedded in our collective culture that doctrine will not
easily be adapted to accommodate and protect contemporary single-mother family
situations"); Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law,
and Family in the United States and Western Europe 254-90 (1989) (discussing
changing laws regarding marriage and family and how these changes affect
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the United States ignores the reality of millions of families who are
affected by its immigration laws, separates children from their
families, and fails to honor a child's right to family as defined by the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and
international law as it has developed in Europe and the Americas.6
This Article suggests that the United States must move
beyond this largely biological narrative of family if it is to protect the
internationally recognized human rights of children. What this
means in practice is that we must reform U.S. immigration law to
reflect a broader conception of family that respects and protects
informal family formations); Grace G. Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage:
A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1125, 1128-29 (1981) (analyzing March
1980 census data and demonstrating that the number of unmarried heterosexual
couples who shared a household had increased by 200% between 1970 and 1980);
Carol S. Bruch, Cohabitation in Common Law Countries a Decade After Marvin:
Settled In or Moving Ahead?, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 717, 717 (1989) (tracing the
liberalization of the law governing non-marital relationships and concluding that
courts and legislatures should clarify and simplify laws affecting cohabitants to
respond to our evolving notions of family); Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De
Facto Spouses, Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10
Fain. L.Q. 101, 101-03 (1976) (discussing challenges de facto marriages present
for legal doctrine); Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior:
Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 275, 275-76 (1981)
(arguing that the law should respect cohabitational relationships, including
polygamous relationships); Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The
Withering Away of Marriage, 62 Va. L. Rev. 663, 698 (1976) (arguing that the line
between marriage and other consensual, intimate relationships has blurred
which presages the "withering away" of marriage as a legal concept); Beverly
Horsburgh, Redefining the Family: Recognizing the Altruistic Caretaker and the
Importance of Relational Needs, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 423, 479-502 (1992)
(analyzing psychological and sociological bases for altruistic caregiving and
recommending such caregivers' claims for economic remedies be recognized by
law); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 209, 214 (1995) ("At
the same time, this Article argues that, however important the biological bond is
as a basis for family relationships, it need not be the exclusive bond. In fact, blood
ties are less significant to the definition of family in the Black community than
they traditionally have been for white America."); see also Gilbert A. Holmes, The
Extended Family System in the Black Community: A Child-Centered Model for
Adoption Policy, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1649, 1669 (1995) (proposing the African-
American extended family as a model for adoption laws and policies for children
in complex family systems).
6. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 8, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44125 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC] ("States Parties undertake to
respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality,
name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference."
(emphasis added)).
512
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functional families as well as the traditional nuclear family. What
this Article suggests is that the notion of parenthood that is reflected
in U.S. immigration law should be reconsidered and modified to
reflect a definition grounded in relationships and care, or what has
been described by Professor Nancy Dowd in a slightly different
context as "nurture."' This would likely include, for example, "the
psychological, physical, intellectual, and spiritual care" of children.9
In this Article, the primary focus, therefore, is on what has been
described as in loco parentis relationships between children and
relatives who are not their biological parents."0 In other words,
relationships in which an adult is operating as a parental figure for a
child in a way that results in the child seeing the adult as a parental
figure.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines the
concept of "functional" families and contrasts it with the largely
biological construction of family grounded in the traditional
conception of a nuclear family that is reflected in U.S. immigration
7. There are many different ways to explore the right to family unity. For
example, we could discuss the right to family through the lens of parental rights,
or through the lens of cultural and racial discrimination. While the right to
family unity from these perspectives may be tangentially discussed here, an
extensive discussion of family unity from these perspectives is beyond the scope
of this Article. Instead, this author has chosen to focus on the rights of the
individual child. For a broader discussion of the recognition of family unity in
international law from these other perspectives see Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer,
Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 213
(2003). Also, this Article may raise questions that extend well beyond
immigration law. Namely, does international law limit the United States' ability
to define what it recognizes as a family? And if so, what are those limits? For
example, does international law affect what the United States must recognize as
a family for inheritance purposes, public benefits, taxation, child custody, divorce,
and visitation? These questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
8. Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and
Nurturing Fathers, 54 Emory L. J. 1271, 1275 (2005).
9. Id. at 1312.
10. The term in loco parentis in this Article loosely refers to situations in
which a child has a parent-like relationship with an adult who is not his
biological parent. It should be noted, however, that in loco parentis can also be a
term of art with a meaning that varies from state to state. The use of the term
here includes relationships that have been characterized in the United States as
equitable adoptions, unformalized step-parent relationships, and other such
functional relationships that are protected by international human rights law.
What is important is not the form but the substance-the focus is on the
functional relationship between an adult and a child, and the term in loco
parentis is used in this Article as shorthand to refer to relationships that are the
emotional equivalent of what we might think of as a parent-child relationship.
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law. This section shows how contemporary family formations in the
United States depart from the notion of a traditional nuclear family.
In this section, the author discusses family-based immigration,
removal and deportation decisions based on family, and the INA's
refugee provisions. This section also explores how U.S. immigration
law fails to recognize functional families and thereby hurts children
who are part of family formations that reflect a more inclusive
narrative of family. This is, in part, a notion of family that is based
not primarily in biology, but is focused instead on the relational
concept of nurture. Part II explores the text and the interpretation
of the CRC, with an eye towards the evolution of the definition of
family in relevant international instruments. In this section, the
author also explores the extension of rights and protections to
functional families under international human rights instruments in
Europe and the Americas, with special attention on the
implementation of the CRC. Part III of this Article examines other
contexts in which U.S. courts are willing to expand the definition of
"family," explains why U.S. immigration law should include a
functional definition of family, and discusses the vital interest of
children in secure and stable relationships. Part III also examines
the impact U.S. immigration law has on so-called mixed-status
families (families whose members have different immigration
statuses). This section also discusses some legitimate concerns with a
functionalist approach. In the final section, the Article concludes that
U.S. immigration law should be reformed to protect functional
families, and in particular to include in loco parentis relationships
within the definition of "child" and thereby take a step towards
respecting the internationally recognized human rights of children.
Ultimately, this Article does not argue that Congress is legally bound
by international law to change the definition of "child" in
immigration law, but instead concludes that compelling children's
interests should guide Congress to follow international human rights
law in a way that is meaningful to children.
11. See generally Dowd, supra note 8, at 1271 ("[Ilt is time to carefully
examine and challenge the assumptions of the Court's view of fathers and recast
constitutional norms. The constitutional norm of fatherhood should be nurture.").
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I. FUNCTIONAL FAMILIES AND U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
A. Defining "Family"
The author's goal in this section is not to provide a
comprehensive review of the anthropological, sociological, and
psychological literature on the meaning of family in different
societies and cultures. Instead, the meaning of "family" to many
children around the world is explored and contrasted with the largely
biologically-based narrative of family which is grounded in the same
traditional conception of a nuclear family that is reflected in U.S.
immigration law. The point of this section is to show that U.S.
immigration law employs a definition of family which is based on a
false construct of human society, cultural constructions, and racial
and ethnic prejudices. This definition fails to reflect the cultural
diversity and realities of many children because, "[w]estern
democracies have conceived of 'family' as a nuclear family, consisting
of a mother, father and one or more (biological or adopted) minor
children."' 2 This ideal nuclear family negates other prevalent family
configurations which make up functional families, such as single-
parent households, grandparent-grandchild households, same-sex
couples, polygamous marriages, and extended family configurations
"in which ... relatives and non-relatives, live in the household, either
in addition to or instead of the expected nuclear family members." 3
For the purposes of this Article, as will be explained below, what is
particularly significant is that this narrative of an ideal nuclear
family reflected in U.S. immigration law ignores the significance of
what this Article refers to as in loco parentis relationships.
1. U.S. Immigration Law's Definition of Family
The conception of family reflected in U.S. immigration law is
a limited vision of family which distorts the narrative of many
children's lives. While cross-cultural research indicates that kinship
and family organization are present in all human societies, the
meaning of these terms has been found to be culturally based. 4 This
12. Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family
and Marriage?: Immigration Law's Conflicted Answers, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 273,
290 (2003).
13. Id. at 290; see also id. at 273-74, 279-82.
14. Nicole L. Sault, Many Mothers, Many Fathers: The Meaning of
Parenting Around the World, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 395, 397 (1996). See
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research also shows that the concept of family is not inherently
biological, but, rather, is defined in reference to its cultural context.
15
As is reflected in United States immigration law, the
predominant view of family equates family with biological
connections.' 6 Furthermore, the notion of family in the United States
reflects three fundamental values of American 7 society: biological
connections, individualism, and a person's ownership over his
children. 8 How these core American values influence the conception
of family in the United States is briefly explored below.
In the United States hierarchy of family relations, biology is
king.' 9 Parental rights are first and foremost grounded in their
biological connection to their children.2 ° Scholars have used the
generally Irene Levin & Jan Trost, Understanding the Concept of Family, 41
Fain. Rel. 348, 348-51 (1992) (acknowledging the complexity and the culturally
relative nature of the concept of family). -
15. Sault, supra note 14, at 397; Janet Dolgin, Biological Evaluations:
Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 Akron L. Rev. 347, 351 (2008) (describing the
traditional American family as a cultural construct that developed during the
Industrial Revolution and early twentieth century).
16. Sault, supra note 14, at 398.
17. The term "American" is used in this Article to refer to the United
States of America. It is used because this term is a term of art in the United
States and has achieved almost universal acceptance as a reference to the United
States of America. The author pauses to acknowledge that its use is inaccurate,
because it ignores the fact that there are many other countries in North and
South America.
18. See Anthony Miller, The Case for the Genetic Parent: Stanley, Quilloin,
Caban, Lehr, and Michael H. Revisited, 53 Loy. L. Rev. 395, 404-05 ("The court
in Pierce stated that '[uinder the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska ... we think it
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control.'" (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925))). See
also Appell, supra note 5, at 690 ("The notion of families during the formative
periods of the United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights and the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments, contemplated a patriarchal household in which the
father presided over and controlled his wife and their children.").
19. John Hill, What Does It Mean to be a "Parent"?: The Claims of Biology
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 419 (1991) ("[A)
fundamentally biological conception of parenthood is ingrained deeply in the
ethos of our culture."); See Appell, supra note 5, at 696 ("The Court's view of
parenthood shows that parenthood is biologically-based . ").
20. Gilbert Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of
Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 Md. L. Rev.
358, 363 (1994) (explaining that Supreme Court case law provides protection for
"traditional families," where a traditional family is defined as one consisting of
married parents with children born of the marriage and therefore biologically
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expression "blood is thicker than water" in recognition of the
importance American culture places on ties by birth.2' This cultural
value is far from universal, though, as anthropologists have found
that in other societies and cultures biology does not occupy the same
superior position with respect to other human connections.2
The second core American value related to the American
conception of family is individualism; specifically, the notion that
each individual exists as an independent entity. This is a moral,
social, and political concept of each individual existing as an
autonomous being in society. As one scholar has explained:
In this cultural system, independence is contrasted with
dependence, which is interpreted as a sign of weakness or
failure. Competition is rewarded and encouraged through
contests, prizes, and grade curves. Even within the family,
individuals are socialized to compete for material resources
as well as attention and affection. Parents vie with each
other over the loyalty of their children and argue over
custody rights.
2 3
related); Janet Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The
Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 52 Conn. L. Rev. 523, 524 (2000)
("Within the traditional family, the nature of familial bonds was predicated on,
and was understood to flow from shared biogenetic substance.").
21. See Franz Neyer & Frieder Lang, Blood is Thicker than Water: Kinship
Orientation across Adulthood, 84 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 310, 310 (2003)
("Lay psychology knows one such rule that states that blood is thicker than
water, implying that kin are generally favored over non-kin.").
22. See, e.g., Anna S. Meigs, Blood Kin and Food Kin, in Conformity and
Conflict: Readings in Cultural Anthropology 117, 117-24 (James P. Spradley &
David McCurdy eds., 6th ed. 1987) (examining a model of kinship in which people
may be related through food production); Johannes Wilbert, Goajiro Kinship and
the Eiruku Cycle, in The Social Anthropology of Latin America 306, 306-57
(Walter Goldschmidt & Harry Hoijer eds., 1970) (describing the unique kinship
model of the Goajiro people).
23. Sault, supra note 14, at 399-400. See also James McHale et al., New
Directions in the Study of Family-Level Dynamics During Infancy and Early
Childhood, 74 New Directions for Child Development 5, 8 (Winter 1996)
(explaining that research on whole-family dynamics indicates that some parents
engage in "hostile-competitive coparenting," which may be exhibited behaviorally,
verbally, and even nonverbally).
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This concept of individualism is related to the concept of ownership.
Historically, women were considered the property of their husbands.
Once married, wives had no identity separate and apart from their
husbands.24 Similarly, children were viewed as the property of their
parents. Rather than communal responsibility for children in a
community or other social group, family in the United States was,
and is still, associated with the notion of a person's ownership over
his property and the individual accumulation of private property.25
In studying the language that people use to describe
themselves and their children, Rothman finds that people use the
language of ownership and property rights.2 6 While it is no longer
acceptable to refer to children as property, some individuals in the
United States operate as if they have the right to raise their children
without interference from others. 27 As one scholar has observed,
24. Carole Shammas, Re-assessing the Married Women's Property Acts, 6 J.
Women's His. 9, 9 (1994) (explaining that under common law, all of a woman's
property was under her husband's control when she married and remained under
his control for the duration of his life).
25. Jonathan Montgomery, Children as Property?, 51 Mod. L. Rev. 323
(1988) (describing two theories of parents' rights: one in which the parents act as
the agents of the child, and one in which the parents have complete dominion
over the child and children are subsequently treated as property); Stuart Hart.,
From Property to Person Status: Historical Perspective on Children's Rights, 46
Am. Psychologist 53 (1991) (explaining that during the 16th, 17th, and 18th
centuries, children were regarded as property and valued for the work they
contributed to the family). In her article, Fathers and the Supreme Court:
Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, Professor Nancy Dowd recognizes this
persistent view of children: "We would no longer express as a constitutional value
the notion that children are property, or that fathers as patriarchs have ultimate
control over their spouses or children. Yet vestiges of that view of children
remain. One example is struggles over naming of children, when fathers fight for
their children to have their last name as a sign of "ownership" or control. A
second example is the common reasoning that, if child support is paid, fathers are
'entitled" by that payment to have a voice in the lives of their children or to insist
on a certain amount and structure of visitation." Dowd, supra note 8, at 1327
(citations omitted).
26. Barbara Katz Rothman, Beyond Others and Fathers: Ideology in
Patriarchal Society, in Mothering: Ideology, Experience, and Agency 139, 150
(Evelyn Nakano Glen et al. eds., 1994) (describing the effect of thinking about
motherhood in terms of property rights).
27. See Andrew Cherlin & Frank F. Furstenberg Jr., Styles and Strategies
of Grandparenting, in Grandparenthood 97, 114-15 (Vern L. Bengtson & Joan F.
Robertson eds., 1985) (discussing how the passive grandparent, who is "loath to
interfere in the raising of the grandchildren," and "under normal circumstances
leaves parenting strictly to the parent," best fits the popular image of American
grandparents).
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"[e]ach parent wants full custody of the child, or complete ownership
and control. 8 For example, in the United States, courts rarely grant
visitation with grandparents or stepparents over the parents'
objections. Such requests for visitation are typically considered an
invasion of the prerogative of the parents and an infringement of
their rights.29
The family narrative that encompasses these values of
biological connection, individualism and ownership is the traditional
nuclear family-a mother and father and one or more (typically)
biological children. This is the family narrative that informs
immigration law in the United States.
28. Sault, supra note 14, at 401. See also McHale, supra note 23, at 8
(describing how competitive parents may engage in their own parenting belief
systems without regard to the other parent's belief system, thereby establishing
another area of marital discord).
29. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000) (concluding that
order of grandparent visitation interfered with parent's fundamental right of
childrearing). Even in Troxel, however, the court acknowledged the diversity of
family forms in today's society. For example, Justice O'Connor acknowledged the
lack of a typical "American" family in her plurality opinion: "The demographic
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an Average American
family." Id. at 63. See Dowd, supra note 8, at 1274-75 ("Troxel can be read as a
case strongly supporting nurturing parents as well as appreciating the range of
families in our society."). See also Appell, supra note 5, at 685 (noting the value of
traditional parental rights doctrine to support nontraditional family forms).
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2. A Broader Conception of Family
In contrast to the narrow conception of family reflected in
U.S. immigration law, many children throughout the world and in
the United States are members of families that make use of shared
parenting roles which fall outside of this narrow conception of family.
In many cultures, parenting is considered a shared responsibility
among a number of people with which a child has a significant
relationship, reflecting a much more communal concept of family:
30
"Among the Zapotec, sharing children is seen as natural
and beneficial for the children, the godparents, and the
community as a whole. Parenthood is understood in terms
of multiple roles performed by different people according to
their personal gifts and abilities. For the Zapotec, having
children means sharing children." This understanding-
that parenthood does not come in one form-stands in
sharp opposition to the exclusive family model used in
American law.
31
Some cultures are based on kinship. In these societies, the
focus is on the collective responsibility to raise children, and there is
less focus on becoming independent from one's family, self-reliance,
and personal achievement. Instead, the focus is more on obedience,
responsibility to family, and collective well-being, typically using the
30. See, e.g., Samuel Putnam et al., Child Temperament and Parenting, in
Handbook of Parenting Vol. 2: Biology and Ecology of Parenting 267 (Marc
Bornstein ed., 2002) (explaining that "[cross-cultural approaches to parenting
have highlighted the fact that parenting involves . . . a lifetime of relationships,"
and describing the distinction between social parents and biological parents in
Botswana); Barry Wellman & Scot Wortley, Brothers' Keepers: Situating Kinship
Relations in Broader Networks of Social Support, 32 Soc. Persp. 273 (1989)
(explaining that community family arrangements actively help people deal with
stresses and opportunities); Melford E. Spiro, Is the Family Universal? The Israeli
Case, in The Nuclear Family in Crisis 81, 82-92 (M. Gordon ed., 1972) (detailing
the Israeli kibbutz system where children are raised in a communal children's
house); Sally Falk Moore, Old Age in a Life-Term Social Arena: Some Chagga of
Kilimanjaro in 1974, in Life's Career - Aging: Cultural Variations on Growing
Old 23, 24 (Barbara G. Myerhoff & Andrei Simic eds., 1978) (describing how
social relations change throughout the course of a person's life in the Chagga
culture).
31. Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond
Exclusivity to a Care Based Standard, 16 Yale J. L. & Feminism 83, 92-93 (citing
Nicole L.Sault, Many Mothers, Many Fathers: The Meaning of Parenting Around
the World, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 395, 404 (1996)).
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kin group as the important reference point. 2 As one anthropologist,
Dr. Nicole Sault, has found:
In societies that emphasize nurturing, sharing and
interdependence, blood ties do not give parents inalienable
rights over their children. All kin ties must be validated by
nurturing through feeding, bathing, healing, or teaching.
People do not have children in the sense of private
individual ownership any more than they have land as
private property. Children, land and ritual objects all
belong to the larger kin group. Children exist as members
of the kin group and the community.
This shared responsibility is reflected in the fluidity of
household membership, for children often live in more than
one household while growing up. In some societies, it is
expected that one or more grandchild will go to live with
the grandparents and keep them company... People move
in with their relatives in response to the varying needs of
all the families involved, influenced by factors such as
economic needs, political violence, sickness and death,
educational opportunities, achieving gender balance, or
personal preferences. 33
In essence, in societies in which the kin group is the dominant point
of reference, "people are encouraged as kin to nurture each other by
providing for one another, feeding each other, or protecting members
of the group whether they be children or adults. The behavior of
mutual support is reinforced by symbolic systems that emphasize the
interconnectedness of people."34
In some cultures, for example, a child's family may include
her godparents, who may have responsibility for guiding her religious
education, providing support for her schooling, and play a significant
32. Sault, supra note 14, at 402; JoAnn McGregor, Children and 'African
Values'. Zimbabwean Professionals in Britain Reconfiguring Family Life, 40 Env't
& Planning 596, 606-07 (2008) (Zimbabwean parents working in Great Britain
rely on an extended family network to look after their children while they are
away so that they continue to learn cultural values).
33. Sault, supra note 14, at 405; See also McGregor, supra note 32, at 606-
07 (discussing the choice of many Zimbabweans to leave their children with
relatives while working abroad).
34. Sault, supra note 14, at 402; see also Ellen Pader, Spatiality and Social
Change: Domestic Space Use in Mexico and the United States, 20 Am. Ethnologist
114, 114-137 (1993) (arguing that the spatial configuration of homes can
reinforce or change social and cultural norms as is evidenced by research in
Mexican and Mexican-American homes).
HeinOnline  -- 41 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 521 2009-2010
522 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [41:509
role in her marriage.35 In others, there may be no formal distinction
between relatives, but a child's "parents" may be the caregivers who
happen to be at home during the hours that the children are at home.
During my last trip to Nicaragua with my wife, for example, I
learned that a number of my wife's cousins call my mother-in-law
"mama" instead of "auntie," because she was their primary caregiver
while they were growing up. This family formation, in essence,
satisfied the children's caretaking needs and created a functional
parent-child relationship between my mother-in-law and her nieces,
but like many caretaking relationships, falls outside the traditional
nuclear conception of family.
3. The Contemporary "American" Family
Notwithstanding the definition of family reflected in U.S.
immigration law, even the contemporary "American" family does not
always reflect the traditional nuclear family. It is not defined only by
biology or traditional legal structures. As contemporary legal
scholars have observed:
Today, far from representing a radical fringe, non-nuclear
families have become the norm for a generation. The
majority of Americans now live in households that do not
mirror the nuclear family model of a wage-earner husband,
homemaker wife, and their biological children, all sharing
one domicile.
36
In other words, the traditional nuclear family is closer to the
exception than the rule in the United States.3 7 The majority of
Americans live in family formations that do not reflect the traditional
two-parent family with biological children,38 and as Barbara
Woodhouse explains, many of these families are a refuge for those in
need.39
The diversity of family forms in today's society has been
widely recognized and discussed. For example, in Troxel v. Granville,
35. See generally Nicole Sault, Baptismal Sponsorship as a Source of Power
for Zapotec Women in Oaxaca, Mexico, 11 J. Latin Am. Lore 225, 225-43 (1985)
(describing the ways in which Zapotec women derive power from the baptismal
sponsorship of children); see also Helen Ebaugh & Mary Curry, Fictive Kin as
Social Capital in New Immigrant Communities, 43 Soc. Persp. 189 (2000)
(comparing and contrasting godparent-like relationships in multiple cultures).
36. Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 570.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 572.
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a case in which the Supreme Court found that an order of
grandparent visitation interfered with a parent's fundamental right
of childrearing, Justice O'Connor acknowledged the lack of a typical
"American" family in her plurality opinion: "The demographic
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average
American family."0 Thus, scholars have observed that "Troxel can be
read as a case strongly supporting nurturing parents as well as
appreciating the range of families in our society."
U.S. Census data also suggest that the traditional nuclear
family is rapidly becoming an American anachronism. 2 According to
the U.S. Census Bureau, for example, in 2007, of 78,425,000
"families,'" 3 only 26,158,000 were comprised of a married couple with
their own children under 18 years old." The Census Bureau also
estimated that in 2003, one-third of all Americans were part of a
stepfamily, and in 2004, 1.7 million American families included
adopted children.4 5 Also, in 2005, 2.3 million grandparents were
responsible for providing for their grandchildren's basic needs 6.4 This
data strongly suggest that the traditional nuclear family does not
reflect the "families" of many children who live in the United States,
and it only tells part of the story because many "American" families
fall outside of the Census Bureau's outmoded definition of family.
47
This is, in part, because many of these families are composed of
immigrants.4 The family structure of immigrant families often does
40. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
41. See Dowd, supra note 8 at 1274-75.
42. For more on the concept of the functional family, see supra note 5.
43. The U.S. Census Bureau recognizes a family as a married couple either
with or without children, unmarried adults with or without children, or a single
parent living with or without children. Census Bureau, U.S. Census, Current
Population Survey (CPS) - Definitions and Explanations (Nov. 18, 2008),
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html.
44. U.S. Census Bureau, Families and Living Arrangements,
httpJ/www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/09s0065.xls.
45. Sloan Work and Family Research Network, Questions and Answers
About Changing Definitions of Families: A Sloan Work and Family Research
Network Fact Sheet (2008), http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/pdfs/changefam.pdf.
46. Id.
47. See Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 570.
48. Currently, there are approximately 37.9 million immigrants in the
United States. Also, the number of births to immigrants has grown from about
230,000 in 1970 to more than 900,000 in 2002. In 2007, there were 10.8 million
school-aged children from immigrant families in the United States. Steven A.
Camarota, Immigrants in the United States, 2007: A Profile of American Foreign-
Born Population (2007), http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/backl007.pdf.
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not reflect the traditional nuclear family, but instead the culture of
the family's native country. 9
In his article, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity
to a Care Based Standard, Matthew M. Kavanagh makes this point:
Twenty-eight million children in the United States grow up
in families in which care is not provided exclusively by two
heterosexual opposite-sex parents. Instead caregivers
increasingly include gay and lesbian families, single parent
or "cohabiting" parent families, families with grandparents
(either as primary caregivers or in addition to primary
caregivers), and various other formations.
We can clearly disagree about whether these aspects of
family life in the United States are good, bad, or mixed, but
refusing to recognize them legally will not help matters.
Despite the reality that US families take a great many
forms, we continue to base our legal decision-making on a
model that is not a reality for a huge proportion of the
affected population.
Cross-culturally, too, we see that what is held up by some
as "natural" is hardly so. In the United States many urban
African-American families and Native American families
have, throughout American history, made significant use of
shared P arenting roles that fall far outside of the exclusive
model. 5
Thus, even the contemporary "American" family does not always
reflect the traditional nuclear family that informs U.S. immigration
law. Consequently, to those critics who would say that we should not
define family to conform to cultures other than "our own," this author
responds that defining family to include functional families also
conforms to "American" culture.
49. Nancy Foner, The Immigrant Family: Cultural Legacies and Cultural
Changes, 31 Int'l Migration Rev. 961 (1997) (examining the way family patterns
change in the process of immigration); Nazli Kibria, Family Tightrope: The
Changing Lives of Vietnamese Americans (1993) (drawing on interviews with
Vietnamese American families to show that the "traditional" family unit rarely
exists).
50. Kavanagh, supra note 31, at 90-93.
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A. U.S. Immigration Law's Narrow Definition of Family
1. Family-Based Immigration
While the INA has long promoted the notion of family unity
in certain circumstances, 5' the statutory preference for a conception
of family that reflects the traditional nuclear family is clear and
unambiguous. In essence, the conception of family unity reflected in
the INA is grounded in the concept of an "immediate family," a
concept which fails to reflect the familial formations of many children
affected by U.S. immigration laws.52
The INA's selection system does not treat all family members
alike. As one author has explained:
Recognized relationships closely track westernized notions
of family and generally only encompass first-degree
relatives; unformalized relationships (de facto or long term
cohabitation) are not recognized. Relationships considered
contrary to public policy, such as bigamous or close-degree
relative marriages, as well as same-sex relationships, will
generally not provide the basis for benefits.
53
Those relatives eligible to immigrate through a family petition are
divided into two main categories. Both categories are made up of
51. See Stephen Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law Policy 147 (4th
ed. 2007); E.P. Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy
1789-1965 505-20 (1981) (emphasizing family unity as a constant objective of
immigration law); Fernando Colon-Navarro, Familia E Inmigracion: What
Happened to Family Unity?, 19 Fla. J. Int'l L. 491, 491 (2007) (noting that the
goal of family reunification has long been a cornerstone of U.S. immigration
policy).
52. Laura L. Lichter, Nuts and Bolts of Family-Based Immigration, in
Immigration Law: Basics and More 229, 231 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 2008);
Hawthorne, supra note 5, at 818-9; Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred
Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law and Society, 1993 Utah L.
Rev. 387 (1993); Faith Robertson Elliot, The Family: Change or Continuity? 4
(1986); See also Martha Minow, 'Forming Underneath Everything That Grows'
Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819, 835-836 (1985)
(outlining an alternative history of family law).
53. Lichter, supra note 52, at 231; see generally Mark Strasser, Domestic
Relations Jurisprudence and the Great Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional
Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 Fordham L. Rev.
921 (1995) (discussing arguments commonly employed by U.S. courts to preclude
lesbian, bisexual and gay people from marrying and having families); Ruthann
Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 Temp. L. Rev. 709,
738-739 n.130 (2002) (citing U.S. state laws that define marriage as a union
between a man and a woman).
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first-degree relatives and would be considered "immediate" family
members by those who recognize this concept. The first category
includes only "immediate relatives" of U.S. citizens:54 parents,
spouses, and unmarried children under the age of twenty-one.5 5 The
second category includes "preference" immigrants:56 unmarried
children of United States citizens (who are over twenty-one at the
time the petition is filed), spouses and unmarried children under
twenty-one of permanent residents, unmarried children over twenty-
one of permanent residents, married sons and daughters of U.S.
citizens, and brothers and sisters of United States citizens where the
petitioner is at least twenty-one years old when the petition is filed.
57
While both "immediate" and "preferred" relatives are permitted entry
to the United States due to their status as family members,
immediate relatives are given priority over "preferred" relatives, who
may have to wait months or years before immigrating. 58 The
54. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i). The preference system does not grant lawful
permanent residents (LPRs) the same rights to family as citizens. Their spouses,
minor children, and unmarried adult children are subject to visa quota limits.
Married children of LPRs are not considered at all under the preference system;
thus, they are excluded entirely from family-based petitions. Spouses, children
and unmarried adult children of LPRs are given a second level preference for a
visa. LPRs must wait approximately four years and nine months for their spouses
and children to receive a visa and join them in the United States. Arshil Kabani,
Separation Anxiety: Uniting the Families of Lawful Permanent Residents, 10
Scholar 169, 176-177 (2008).
55. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i); Lichter, supra note 52, at 233.
56. INA § 201(b)(2); see also Lichter, supra note 52, at 233.
57. INA § 203(a)(1)-(4). Unlike immediate relatives, so-called "preference"
relatives have to wait for an immigrant visa number to become available; it may
take years before one becomes available. See Lichter, supra note 52, at 233. One
author explains, "[elven after prior approval, eligibility for immigration benefits
may be lost to subsequent divorce or marriage, or simply due to aging out of a
category before a visa becomes available." Id. at 232.
58. INA §201(b)(2); INA § 203. Relatives can immigrate as a "derivative"
family member, due to their relationship to the petitioner, but even if this status
is available, it is limited to the beneficiary's spouse and any unmarried children
under the age of twenty-one. See Lichter, supra note 52, at 236; INA § 204
(a)(1)(D)(i)-(ii). Before 1990, this system resulted in backlogs of family members
waiting to enter the United States in order to be reunited with their relatives,
and, notwithstanding reforms in 1990, severe backlogs have continued. See
Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FY 2006
Statistical Year Book B2 (2006), httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy06syb.pdf.
Although the immigration courts completed more cases than they received in
fiscal years 2004 and 2006, the backlogs from previous years still outnumber the
surplus completions. Id. The BIA meanwhile has consistently had a backlog
despite procedural reforms to improve the system. Id. at 82; See Procedural
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immediate relatives can immigrate as soon as their visa petition is
filed and approved by United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services.59
The total number of family-based visas which can be issued
in any one year is 480,000, and these are distributed according to a
hierarchical preference system.60 The following chart summarizes the
INA preference system with the yearly quota assigned to each
category and approximate backlog waiting time.61
Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,879 (Aug. 26,
2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1).
59. See INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i).
60. See INA § 201(c)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(c)(1)(A)(i) (West 1999).
61. See Department of State, Visa Bulletin, No. 11, Vol. XI. (Aug. 2009),
available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_4539.html#. (The
backlog times listed here are approximate and apply to all chargeability areas
except mainland China, India, Mexico and the Philippines); Rachel Salazar
Parrefias & Cerissa Salazar Parrefias, Workers Without Families: The
Unintended Consequences, 10 Asian L.J. 143, 149-150 (2003); Emma 0. Guzman,
The Dynamics of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996: the Splitting-Up of American Families, 2 Scholar 95, 113-115 (2000); See
INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151-1153 (West 1999); See also Ira J. Kurzban,
Kurzban's Immigration Law Sourcebook 622 (9th ed. 2004) as cited in Noel L.
Griswold, Forgetting The Melting Pot: An Analysis off the Department of
Homeland Security Takeover of the INS, 39 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 207, 216 (2005).
Also note that there is a fifth preference for displaced persons fleeing from a
Communist country, a Middle Eastern country, and persons uprooted by a
national catastrophe. Also, categories of visas based on employment, which were
initially part of the preference system, were separated into their own categories
in the 1990 reform.
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Pre- Relationship Quota Backlog
ference to petitioner (approx.)
1st Adult unmarried 23,400 plus any visas that 6 1 Years
sons and daughters the fourth and last family-
of citizens sponsored preference aliens
do not use.
2nd Legal permanent 114,200 visas, plus any 4 Years
residents' spouse visas that the first category
and children as does not need, per year.
defined by the INA
2nd Legal permanent 8 Years
residents' unmarried
sons and daughters
3rd Married sons and 23,400 plus any visas that 8 Years
daughters of citizens the first and second
preferences do not use per
year.
4th Brothers and sisters 65,000 visas plus any that 11 1/2 Years
of adult citizens the first, second, and third
preferences do not use per
year.
As this chart demonstrates, family-based immigration is
largely based on the parent-child relationship. For purposes of the
INA, a "child" is only a minor child, which denies the immediacy of a
parent-child relationship where the son or daughter is older than
twenty-one years of age or married.62 Moreover, to qualify as a child,
an individual must fall into one of the six statutorily defined
categories of children, which, while possibly more inclusive than in
the past (because, for example, adopted children and children born
out of wedlock are included), reflect what one would think of as a
child in a nuclear family: (1) children born in wedlock,63 (2)
stepchildren,64 (3) legitimated children,6 5 (4) children born out of
62. Hawthorne, supra note 5, at 815; See INA § 203(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1153(a)(1) (West 1999); see also INA § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b) (West 1999)
(defining a child to be "an unmarried person under twenty-one years" old).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A) (2000).
64. There are various interpretive guides, including the statute itself, that
help fill out the definition of stepchild for the purposes of family immigration.
Pursuant to the statute, child status is afforded to a stepchild, "whether or not
born out of wedlock, provided the child had not reached the age of 18 years at the
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time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred." 8 U.S.C. §
1101(b)(1)(B) (2000). "A valid marriage is sufficient to create a step relationship
recognized for immigration benefits without any parental interest from the
stepparent in the stepchild." Sarah B. Ignatius & Elisabeth S. Stickney,
Immigration Law and the Family § 6:9 (Thomson West 2008) [hereinafter
Immigration Law and the Family] (citing Medina-Morale v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
520, 531-532 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no need to consider the strength of the
stepparent-child bond where no evidence that marriage underlying stepparent
status was a sham)). One corollary of the inclusion of children born out of wedlock
and the decision not to require evidence of parental interest is that children born
outside of the marital relationship-as in, for example, a father's child from an
adulterous affair-can qualify as stepchildren. Id. (citing cases). Step status may
be lost if the marriage underpinning it is terminated, but "[ilf the step
relationship continues despite death or divorce, the child remains a stepchild."
Immigration Law and the Family, at § 6:12. In other words, while the existence of
a genuine relationship or emotional bond between the stepchild and stepparent is
not a prerequisite to establishing stepchild status, it may be required to maintain
step status in the event that the parent dies or the stepparent's marriage to the
parent ends in divorce. By contrast, the step relationship, for the purposes of the
INA, terminates regardless of the character of the emotional relationship
between the stepparent and the child if the marriage is found to be legally
invalid. Matter of Awwal., I. & N. Dec. 617, 621, 1998 WL 235449 (B.I.A. 1988)
("Where there is not and never has been a valid marriage, there cannot be a step
relationship under the immigration laws."). If however, a country recognizes a
form of marriage such as polygamy that would be invalid in the United States,
the children of one spouse in the marriage are considered stepchildren of the
other spouses. See Immigration Law and the Family, at § 6:12 (citing Matter of
Man, 16 1. & N. Dec. 543, 1978 WL 36451 (B.I.A. 1978)).
65. A child falls into this category if she: (1) is legitimated, (2) the
legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of 18, and (3) the child is
in the legal custody of the legitimating parent at the time of the legitimation. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C) (2000) (The statute defines this category of child in full to
be: "[A) child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile or
under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or outside of the
United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of
eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or
parents at the time of such legitimation."). Legitimation generally occurs when
the biological parents of a child born out of wedlock subsequently marry. Other
forms of legitimation include laws eliminating legal distinctions between
legitimate and illegitimate children, judicial decrees legitimating children in the
context of paternity proceedings, the written acknowledgement of paternity, and
the "open and notorious recognition of paternity." See Immigration Law and the
Family, supra note 64, at § 6:17-22. The legal custody requirement is met either
if there is a court order awarding custody or there is a "natural right" to custody,
which is essentially legal custody that is presumed to exist for biological parents.
See id. at § 6:22.
HeinOnline  -- 41 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 529 2009-2010
530 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [41:509
wedlock,66 (5) adopted children,67 or (6) orphan children from abroad
who will be adopted by American parents.68
The consequence of this narrow conception of family is, of
course, that if a child living in a non-traditional family formation
wants to immigrate-with her family-based on a family petition,
66. Under the INA, a child born out of wedlock is entitled to child status if
immigration benefits are sought on his behalf "by virtue of the relationship of the
child to its natural mother or to its natural father if the father has or had a bona
fide parent-child relationship with the person." 11 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D)(2000).
This provision applies different standards to natural mothers and fathers,
requiring only the latter to establish a bona fide relationship: "The determination
of a bona fide parent-child relationship occurs on a case-by-case basis . ..
Evidence of a bona fide relationship 'is varied and widespread in nature.'
Numerous types of documents showing concern, financial and emotional support
are relevant. Persuasive evidence includes proof that the parties actually lived
together at some point, or that the father actually held out the child as his own or
provided for some or all of the child's needs, or that in general his behavior
evidenced a genuine concern for the child." Immigration Law and the Family,
supra note 64, at § 6:26. The BIA's regulatory standard is that a bona fide
relationship exists "where the father demonstrates or has demonstrated an active
concern for the child's support, instruction and general welfare." 8 C.F.R. §
204.2(d)(2)(iii) (2009).
67. A child is an adopted child for purposes of the INA if the child was (1)
adopted while under the age of sixteen years, and (2) is in the legal custody of and
has resided with the adopting parent or parents for at least two years. 8 U.S.C. §
1101(b)(1)(E)(i) (2000). An alternative to meeting the second requirement is to
show that the child "has been battered or subject to extreme cruelty by the
adopting parent or by a family member of the adopting parent residing in the
same household." Id. "Adopted children" status, once granted, extends INA
"child" status to natural siblings of the adopted child, provided that siblings are
also adopted by the same parents and were adopted while under the age of
eighteen. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(ii) (2000).
68. A final category of children is orphans from abroad. The requirements
that a child must meet to fall into this category are: (1) the child must be either
16 at the time an "immediate relative" petition for permanent legal residency
status is filed, (2) the child must be an orphan because either (a) both parents
disappeared, abandoned, or deserted the child, or became separated from or lost
the child, or (b) the sole surviving parent is incapable of providing the proper care
and has in writing irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption,
and (3) the child must be adopted either by an unmarried American citizen of at
least 25 years of age or by an American citizen and his/her spouse that have
personally seen or observed the child prior to or during the adoption proceedings
(or, alternatively, the child is coming to the United States for adoption). 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1(F)(i) (2000). In addition, the adoptive parents must meet the pre-
adoption requirements, if any, of the proposed residence and furnish proper care.
Id. Natural siblings under the age of 18 who have been adopted abroad or who
are coming to the United States for adoption by the same parents, qualify for
child status. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F)(ii) (2000).
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she will not be able to do so. If a child is trying to immigrate with her
aunt who was her primary caretaker since birth, she will not be
permitted to do so, as the aunt would not fit into either category of
relatives recognized on a family petition. Similarly, if a grandmother
of a child wanted to enter the United States with her grandchild who
calls her "mama," because it was this grandmother who raised her,
this relationship would not be one recognized as a family petition.
While from the child's perspective, the aunt in the former case, and
the grandmother in the latter, might be the most significant relatives
in this child's life, in neither case is there an allowance for this
reality under U.S. immigration law.
Imagine, for example, a young woman who lives in Nicaragua
and is a Nicaraguan citizen. She marries a U.S. citizen and is
immediately eligible for a visa to immigrate to the United States.
This young woman has cared for her now twelve year-old nephew
since his birth. Although the boy's mother cannot care for him, she
will not consent to any adoption. She would allow him, however, to
move to the United States with his aunt. Unfortunately, if the boy
were to arrive with his aunt at the U.S. embassy in Nicaragua, they
would be told that because this woman is not legally or biologically
the boy's mother, they would not be able to immigrate together on a
family petition.69 This tragic scenario underscores the fact that the
INA's conception of family is an unnecessarily narrow conception
which may not reflect many of the families of those children who
emigrate.
2. Cancellation of Removal Based on Family
The narrow notion of family which is codified in the section of
the INA that governs family-based immigration also permeates the
law governing the removal of certain nonpermanent residents. This
law is part of IRRIRA and allows otherwise removable nonpermanent
residents to remain in the United States, if the nonpermanent
resident satisfies certain residency and moral character
requirements and "establishes that removal would result in
69. Some may ask why we should protect functional families in the
immigration context when we do not afford the same protections to functional
families in all aspects of domestic law. In response, while the immigration context
poses unique challenges, and an extensive discussion of the protection that
should be afforded the functional family in the domestic context is beyond the
scope of this Article, this author supports the notion that protection should be
afforded to functional families in the domestic context.
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exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse,
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence."7" The definition of a
"child," as held by the Supreme Court in a case involving this
statute's precursor, explicitly excludes any individual who does not
fit within the INA's statutory definition of "child," even if that
individual's "relationship with the deportable alien closely resembles
that of a parent and child."7
The case before the Supreme Court involved a woman named
Virginia Hector who was a native and citizen of Dominica in the
West Indies. Ms. Hector entered the United States in April 1975 as a
nonimmigrant visitor, but overstayed her visa and remained in the
United States without legal status from April 30, 1975 until 1983,
when the United States instituted deportation proceedings against
her. Ms. Hector lived with and cared for the youngest of her four
children, a ten-year-old boy, and two of her nieces who were United
States citizens aged ten and eleven. The nieces' parents lived in
Dominica at the time.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded, as a
matter of law, that a niece is not a "child" within the meaning of the
deportation statute.7 But the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
granted Ms. Hector's petition for review and remanded the case to
the BIA, holding that the BIA erred by not sufficiently considering
whether Ms. Hector's relationship with her nieces was the functional
equivalent of a parent-child relationship. The remand order
instructed the BIA to ascertain whether Ms. Hector had a "parental-
type relationship" with her nieces, and, if so, to determine whether
the nieces would experience extreme hardship as a result of Ms.
Hector's deportation.
In issuing the remand order, the Third Circuit relied on its
own precedent in Tovar v. I.N.S., which held that the BIA should
have considered the hardship to a nonpermanent resident's
grandchild where the relationship between the two closely resembled
that of a parent to a child.74 In Tovar, the Third Circuit reasoned that
Ms. Tovar and her grandson Christian comprised a family and
shared the relationship of mother to child:
70. 8 U.S.C.A. §1229b(b)(1)(D) (West 2008).
71. I.N.S. v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1986).
72. Id.
73. Hector v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1985).
74. Tovar v. I.N.S., 612 F.2d 794, 798 (3d Cir. 1980).
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Christian is emotionally attached and financially
dependent on Maria Tovar. Testimony at the hearing
indicated that he thought of her as his mother, despite his
having been informed of the identity of his natural mother.
Furthermore, we recognize that grandmother headed
households are worthy of fundamental respect. Therefore
we believe it proper to extend the same privilege that the
suspension provision affords the nuclear family to this
grandmother-headed family.
75
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court overruled this precedent in I.N.S.
v. Hector, explicitly holding that the Court is "constrained to hold
that Congress, through the plain language of the statute, precluded
this functional approach to defining 'child."7 6 Although relying on the
plain language of the statute, the Court also noted legislative history
which "corroborated" the statute's plain language:
With respect to suspension of deportation, the Senate
rejected a draft of the bill that focused on the hardship to
the 'immediate family.' See S. 716, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1951). In a prepared analysis of S. 716, the INS expressed
concern about this undefined term that the INS considered
'obscure, uncertain, and difficult, if not impossible, to
administer' since the language could 'conceivably be
claimed to include any relative of the alien, by blood or
marriage, who might be living with him in his household.' 4
INS, Analysis of S. 716, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 244-2 and
244-3 (1951) (emphasis in original). Instead, the INS asked
Congress to list the 'particular relatives who are intended
to be described.' Id., at 244-3. The bill that was eventually
75. Id. at 798 (citation omitted).
76. Hector, 479 U.S. at 90. For more discussion on the statutes which
allowed for the consideration of family hardship in deportation proceedings see
Susan L. Kamlet, Comment, Judicial Review of "Extreme Hardship" in
Suspension of Deportation Cases, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 175, 175 (1984). See also
Mejia-Carillo v. I.N.S., 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1981) (family separation may
constitute extreme hardship); Villena v. I.N.S., 622 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir.
1980) (separation of close relatives may constitute extreme hardship); Antoine-
Dorcelli v. I.N.S., 703 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1983) (BIA should give due
consideration to family separation in suspension of deportation proceedings in a
case where petitioner was not related to the Craig family but had lived with, been
treated as, and considered herself a member of that family for over 30 years);
Contreras-Buenfil v. I.N.S., 712 F.2d 401, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the BIA should give due consideration to family separation in suspension of
deportation proceedings in a case in which petitioner would be separated from the
woman he loved and her children, one of whom was his own); see Kamlet, at 199-
200.
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passed contained the 'parent, spouse, or child' language
that is now in effect.
77
Explicitly deferring to the will of Congress, the Supreme Court, in
essence, concluded that it is powerless to extend to functional
families the provisions of U.S. immigration law which are meant to
protect family integrity and the welfare of children.7
More than twenty years after Hector, the case continues to
bind U.S. courts. In one case, Macario Moreno applied for
cancellation of removal on the ground that his removal would cause
hardship for his grandchildren who were citizens of the United
States. Mr. Moreno had legal custody of his grandchildren and was in
the process of adopting them, but the adoption had not been
finalized. The children's mother had already been removed to Mexico.
While not questioning the parent-child relationship between Mr.
Moreno and the children, the Ninth Circuit held that Mr. Moreno's
grandchildren did not qualify as 'children' under the INA although
Mr. Moreno was in loco parentis, because Congress had specifically
precluded such a functional approach to defining the term 'child' for
cancellation of removal purposes.79
At least one circuit, while acknowledging Hector as binding
precedent, has lamented its holding and explained that "the INA's
definition of 'child' may be far out of step with the times, and may
have a particularly deleterious effect on aliens whose culture's
definition of 'family' is legitimately broader than the traditional
definition of those related by blood or adoption."8 0 As this line of cases
explains, it would be up to Congress to conform the definition of
family to one that reflects the broader, more inclusive conception of
family.
77. Hector, 479 U.S. at 90 n.6.
78. As noted above, this Article does not argue that if this case came up
today the Court should extend the notion of the constitutional family to
functional families. Nor is it arguing that the Court should apply human rights
law to overrule congressional intent. The argument is that immigration law
should be guided by human rights principles in a way that is meaningful to
children.
79. Moreno-Morante v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007); see
also Ayala-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 221 Fed.Appx. 570, 571 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a granddaughter does not fall under the definition of 'child" for the
purpose of establishing eligibility for relief).
80. Dorado v. Gonzales, 202 Fed. Appx. 898, 902 (6th Cir. 2006).
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3. The INA's Refugee Provisions
The definition of family in the context of U.S. immigration
law is also relevant when discussing the circumstances under which
children can immigrate to, or remain in, the United States with a
functional parent who is granted asylum. The Attorney General may
grant asylum to a "refugee,""1 which is defined as "a person unable or
unwilling to return to the country of that person's nationality or
habitual residence because of past persecution or because of a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group,82 or political
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2000).
82. Although not directly concerning the protection of functional parental
relationships or family unity, the definition of "social group" that has developed
through case law betrays how the INA privileges nuclear and immediate families
over extended families and may even privilege certain relationships within
nuclear families over others. In the leading case of Gebremichael v. I.N.S, for
example, the court found that "[t]here can, in fact, be no plainer example of a
social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics than
that of the nuclear family. Indeed, quoting the Ninth Circuit, we recently stated
that 'a prototypical example of 'a particular social group' would consist of the
immediate members of a certain family, the family being a focus of fundamental
affiliational concerns and common interests for most people." 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st
Cir. 1993) (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir.
1986)). A Ninth Circuit case, subsequently vacated and remanded without
elaboration, further suggests that courts are prone to examine closely the level of
extension of the familial ties in assessing whether there is a recognizable social
group. Aguirre-Cervantes v. I.N.S., 242 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001) (vacated
decision) ("The factors which lead us to conclude that the petitioner's family
group qualifies as a 'particular social group' are that the petitioner's family
members are part of an immediate as opposed to an extended, family unit."
(emphasis added)). This trend notwithstanding, there is some case law
supporting the notion that extended families may also constitute social groups.
One case specifically affords social group status to an extended family. Bamba v.
Attorney General, 278 Fed.App'x. 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming, without
comment, an administrative judge's finding that the petitioner was entitled to
withholding of removal based on his membership in a particular social group,
which was his extended family). And in a major case revisiting Acosta at length,
the BIA held that the extended family-related concept of a clan can qualify as a
social group, concluding that "clan membership is a highly recognizable,
immutable characteristic that is acquired at birth and is inextricably linked to
family ties." In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342 (B.I.A. 1996). Even the Ninth
Circuit has noted that its recognition "that 'a prototypical example' [of a social
group] is the nuclear family does not imply that other sets of identified close
family relationships might not qualify as a social group." Chen v. Ashcroft, 289
F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (vacated and remanded to BIA upon briefing
by parties). Nevertheless, the rarity of extended family "social group" cases is
striking.
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opinion."83 While a spouse or child of an alien who is granted asylum
may also be granted the status of asylee and thereby immigrate to or
remain in the United States for the sake of family unity, only those
children meeting the INA's definition of "child" may do so.84 In a
recent unpublished case, Tamrat v. Mukasey, in which a native and
citizen from Ethiopia, Etsgenet Tamrat, applied for asylum for both
herself and the son of her common law husband, for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained that
the son could not be a derivative beneficiary of the applicant as he
did not meet the INA's definition of child.85
As the child in Tamrat v. Mukasey was the son of Tamrat's
common law husband, it seems possible that Tamrat was a
functional parent for this child and that the child considered Tamrat
his mother. Tamrat likely had nurtured this child, and may have
been the main-or one of the main-providers of the child's
"psychological, physical, intellectual, and spiritual care."86 But this
was irrelevant in the eyes of the court as Tamrat's common law son
did not meet the INA's statutory definition of child.
Therefore, in context of family based immigration and
cancellation of removal, the INA's definition of "child" in its refugee
provisions precludes consideration of such functional relationships as
persons standing in loco parentis-including a primary caregiver
grandmother, or another family member who has served as the de
facto parent for a child-thereby narrowing the circumstances under
which many families may remain together.
II. HOW U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW CONFLICTS
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
In this part, the author explores how U.S. immigration law's
treatment of functional families conflicts with the internationally
recognized human rights of children. Although this Article does not
83. Id. (quoting Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002))
(emphasis added).
84. 8 U.S.C. 1158 (b)(3)(A) (2000).
85. Tamrat v. Mukasey, 258 Fed.App'x. 587, 2007 WL 4426635 (4th Cir.
Dec. 17, 2007).
86. Dowd, supra note 8, at 1312.
87. It is recognized that from the perspective of some scholars, this position
is largely aspirational, at least in the United States. In The Plenary Power
Doctrine, for example, KifAugustine-Adams argues that the strong statements in
favor of family unity in human rights documents are limited in the context of
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conclude that international law legally compels Congress to change
the definition of the term "child" as it appears in immigration law, it
does conclude that children's interests should guide Congress to
honor international human rights law in a way that is meaningful to
children. This section shows how the INA's definition of "child" does
not honor the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) as it has been interpreted and implemented around the world.
First, the text and the interpretation of the CRC are explored with an
eye towards the evolution of the definition of family in relevant
international instruments. Then the extension of rights and
protections to functional families under international human rights
instruments in Europe and the Americas is explored, especially with
reference to the implementation of the CRC.
A. The CRC and a Child's Right to Live in the Context of Her
Family
The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the
CRC in November 1989. With the exception of the United States and
Somalia, every United Nations member state has ratified the CRC. 88
Somalia's failure to ratify the CRC can be attributed to the absence
of a government stable enough to effect ratification. 89 But the United
States' failure to ratify is more complex. The United States objects to
ratification on many levels, mostly related to perceived threats to the
international covenants and court decisions addressing immigration and
citizenship, and that immigration and citizenship are treated as separate from
other substantive areas in which international human rights norms traditionally
apply. Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
701, 721-35. Augustine-Adams also raises a frequent criticism of international
law, even in cases where rights do exist, which is the difficulty in enforcing these
rights. Id. Still, even Augustine-Adams is forced to admit that "a very limited
right to remain with family members in a country may be emerging under the
European Convention on Human Rights." Id. at 728.
88. Office of The United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights,
Status of Ratifications of The Principal International Human Rights Treaties as
of 9 June 2004, http://cjei.org/publications.html (follow "NB List of Countries and
Treaties Ratified Ratification Report" hyperlink). The United States signed the
Convention on February 16, 1995. Somalia signed it on May 9, 2002.
89. The Campaign for U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, What is the Status of the CRC?,
http://childrightscampaign.org/crcindex.php?sNav=getinformed-snav.php&sDat=
status-dat.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) ("At present, Somalia is without a
functioning central government. However, parties within the government
structure have committed to signing and ratifying the CRC once the situation is
rectified.").
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prerogatives of either the state (or the states) or a child's parents.
Not surprisingly, many of the developed countries which have
ratified the CRC have done so with reservations which reflect some of
the concerns of the United States.9"
Before the CRC's adoption, the protections and rights owed to
children under international law were constantly evolving. This
evolution began with the Declaration of the Rights of Children
adopted by the League of Nations in September 192491 and continued
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948,92
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1959, 93 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in
1966.94 Over time, the focus on children shifted from protection to the
establishment of rights for children as members of society.95 The
CRC, together with its Optional Protocols, 96 is the latest codification
of this shift in focus.
In addition to the shift in focus from protection to rights, one
can see in these instruments an evolution in the definition of family
for the purposes of protecting the child. Commencing with the
UDHR, the family was defined as the basic unit of society, which
must be supported by the family of nations97 and protected from
90. For example, the United Kingdom ratified the Convention with a
reservation on Article 22 due to possible intervention in immigration processes.
In September 2008, however, the U.K. announced that it was withdrawing its
reservation on immigration and nationality matters under Article 22, as well as
the one under Article 37(c) relating to confinement conditions for children.
Children Rights Alliance England, http://www.crae.org.uk/news-and-
events/news/uk-ratify-optional-protocol.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
91. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Sept. 26, 1924, League
of Nations, O.J. Spec. Supp. 21, 43 (1924).
92. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].
93. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N.
GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959)
[hereinafter Dec. of Rights of Child].
94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
95. See Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.
17, at 9-14 (Aug. 28, 2002), available at http://www.crin.org/docs/advisory-
opinionl7.pdf [hereinafter IACtHR Advisory Opinion 171.
96. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (May 25, 2000).
97. UDHR, supra note 92, art. 16(3).
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arbitrary interference. 8 What that family looked like, however, was a
function of the society that was creating the relevant legal regime. In
the first part of the twentieth century, western countries with
nuclear models of family life and a belief that the protection of
mother and child was the first priority predominated. By 1989, when
the United Nations adopted the CRC, the concept of family had
evolved, at least in part, throughout Western countries. Support for
the family, and the "family life" to which a child had a right, began to
increasingly encompass families that looked quite different from the
traditional model, including divorced parents (both of whom could
have an important part in a child's life),99 parents out of wedlock,
whether living together or separately,1" gay and lesbian applicants
for adoption, 1 and single fathers. 10 2 In short, the focus on a tight
nuclear family consisting of two parents and a child had moved
towards an appreciation of the role of the extended or functional
family in the raising of a child.
This change reflects in some part the evolution in the
western concept of family, but it also arguably reflects the effect of
globalization on children's rights. When the Geneva Declaration on
Human Rights was adopted in 1924, the family was not referenced at
all. Instead, the Declaration was concerned with the protection of the
child from specified evils and the promotion of his or her material
98. Id. art. 12.
99. See, e.g., Berrehab v. Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21
(1988) (holding that the bond formed between a child and his parents amounts to
family life even when the parents no longer live together); Ciliz v. Netherlands,
2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 267, 59-60 (2000) (holding that a bond between father
and child amounted to "family life" even when the parents divorced and the
father no longer lived with the child).
100. See, e.g., Keegan v. Ireland, 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 50 (1994)
(holding that a right to develop family ties between a father and child existed
even when the child was born out of wedlock, and that placing the child in an
adoptive home without the father's consent or knowledge violated that right);
Sahin v. Germany, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct H.R. 63 at 86-95 (2003) (holding that there
was no justification for differentiating between the rights of parents of children
born out of wedlock and parents of children born in wedlock); Johnston v. Ireland,
112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986) (same); Sommerfeld v. Germany, 2003-VIII Eur.
Ct H.R. 137 (2003) (same).
101. See, e.g., E.B. v France, App. no. 43546/02, Eur. Ct H.R. (2008)
(holding that the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms prohibits denying lesbian couples the right to adopt
children).
102. See, e.g., Nolan and K. v. Russia, App. no. 2512/04 Eur. Ct H.R. at
80-83 (2009) (holding that a single father had a significant interest in remaining
in close physical proximity with his son).
HeinOnline  -- 41 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 539 2009-2010
540 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [41:509
and spiritual development. By 1948, when the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights was adopted, the family had been given a central
role itself worthy of protection. Article 16(3) provides that "[tihe
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State." In addition, children
had been given separate status, albeit in the context of their
relationship with their mother. 10 3 Also, fathers became a part of the
picture in the provision that gives parents the "prior right" to choose
the kind of education to be given their children."
In 1959, The Declaration of the Rights of the Child
introduced the concept of children's rights, the "best interests of the
child" standard, °5 and an enhanced role for both parents in the
development of children-although it retained the special status of
the mother. 10 6 In 1966, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights was adopted and recognized that "[the
widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society,
particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the
care and education of dependent children."0 7 This covenant also
changed the special status that mothers used to have while the child
is "of tender years," as in the 1959 Declaration, to the limited period
before and after childbirth' ° 8 and introduced the concept of a legal
guardian who may take the place of parents in certain cases.'0 9
103. "Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.
All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social
protection." UDHR, supra note 92, art. 25(2).
104. "Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall
be given to their children." Id. art. 26(3).
105. See Dec. of Rights of Child, supra note 93, princs. 2, 7.
106. "The child, for the full and harmonious development of his
personality, needs love and understanding. He shall, wherever possible, grow up
in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, and, in any case, in an
atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security; a child of tender
years shall not, save in exceptional circumstances, be separated from his mother."
Id. princ. 6.
107. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, art. 10(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
ICESCRI.
108. "Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable
period before and after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be
accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits." Id. art. 10(2).
109. Article 13(3) provides that: "The States Parties to the present
Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when
applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those
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The ICCPR introduced the concept of the equality of the
father and the mother" ° and the right of a child to registration at
birth, a name, and a nationality."' It is clear then, that by the mid-
1970s, the child's place in the international legal regime had
changed, the family had been elevated to "the natural and
fundamental group unit of society," and parental rights had put the
father and mother on more equal footing. The focus remained,
however, on married parents and the nuclear family.
Finally, the CRC represents a revolutionary change in the
scope of children's rights. Its provisions deal comprehensively with a
wide range of issues relating to children and envision a child who will
have, in addition to a relationship with one or both of his or her
parents, relationships with other relatives and caregivers. For
example, Articles 23(2) and (3), concerning children with disabilities,
refer to "the parents or others caring for the child." The CRC also
envisions a child whose cultural heritage and context is an important
referent in supporting him or her. The CRC's preamble, for example,
introduces a reference to the "family environment," which includes
an "atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.
" ' 12
More than fifteen years after the United Nations adopted the
CRC, the Committee on the Rights of the Child specifically
recognized that the word "family" in the preamble to the CRC "refers
established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum
educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with
their own convictions." Id. art. 13(3).
110. "1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 2. The right of men and
women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized. 3.
No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the
intending spouses. 4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take
appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution,
provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children." ICCPR,
supra note 94, art. 23.
111. "1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the
right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on
the part of his family, society and the State. 2. Every child shall be registered
immediately after birth and shall have a name. 3. Every child has the right to
acquire a nationality." Id. art. 24.
112. CRC, supra note 6, pmbl (recognizing that the child, for the fifll and
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love, and understanding).
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to a variety of arrangements that can provide for young children's
care, nurturance and development, including the nuclear family, the
extended family, and other traditional and modern community-based
arrangements, provided these are consistent with children's rights
and best interests."' 3 Article 3(2) further expands the list of those
who may be in the position of exercising parental responsibilities to
parents, legal guardians, or "other individuals" legally responsible for
the child, while Article 5 anticipates that parental responsibilities
may rest with members of the extended family or the community and
refers to local custom as a source of information about the
appropriate people to exercise such rights in certain cases.'
1 4
Other provisions of the CRC also clearly envision a more
inclusive definition of "family" than the nuclear family. Article 8(1),
for example, provides that attributes of a child's protected identity
include not only name and nationality but also "family relations" and
Article 20(1) provides special protection and assistance to a child
deprived of a "family environment." This right is separate from the
rights related to the child's separation from her parents in Article 9.
Article 21(a) discusses the determination that an adoption is
permissible "in view of the child's status concerning parents,
relatives and legal guardians." Article 22(2), dealing with refugee
children, directs states "to protect and assist such a child and to trace
the parents or other members of the family of any refugee child in
order to obtain information necessary for reunification with his or
her family."
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child
continues to recognize the expansive definition of family in the CRC,
commenting in 2006 that:
[F]amily patterns are variable and changing in many
regions, as is the availability of informal networks of
support for parents, with an overall trend towards greater
diversity in family size, parental roles and arrangements
113. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 7 (2005),
Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood, 15, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/GC/7fRev.1 (Sept. 20, 2006) [hereinafter CRC Gen. Comment 7].
114. 'States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of
parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community
as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally
responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the
child of the rights recognized in the present Convention." CRC, supra note 6,
art. 5.
542
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for bringing up children. These trends are especially
significant for young children, whose physical, personal and
psychological development is best provided for within a
small number of consistent, caring relationships. Typically,
these relationships are with some combination of mother,
father, siblings, grandparents and other members of the
extended family, along with professional caregivers
specialized in childcare and education. The Committee
acknowledges that each of these relationships can make a
distinctive contribution to the fulfilment of children's rights
under the Convention and that a range of family patterns
may be consistent with promoting children's well-being."1
5
This comment shows how the CRC, in expanding and delineating the
rights of the child, takes into account the roles played by the child's
culture and extended family. Although numerous provisions of the
CRC are specifically attuned to the parent-child relationship, they
are no longer exclusive, and even they anticipate that there may be
instances in which people other than parents take on the
responsibility of parents.
Like the CRC, certain policies set out by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees have sought to protect the rights of
children by establishing protections for the functional family. In
February 1997, UNHCR issued Guidelines on Policies and
Procedures in dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking
Asylum' 16 acknowledging that:
For cultural, social or other reasons, a child may not have
been raised by his/her natural parents. If a child is in a first
asylum country with an adult other than the natural
parent but who has nevertheless assumed the principal
caretaking responsibilities towards the child, then this
arrangement should be respected even if it has not been
legally formalised."17
These Guidelines and the CRC reveal that international law now
increasingly requires the protection of functional families as
essential to children's rights. The United States, unfortunately, has
115. CRC Gen. Comment 7, supra note 113, at 19.
116. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Guidelines on
Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking
Asylum 6 (1997), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3360.html.
117. See also United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile
Delinquency [Riyadh Guidelines], G.A. Res. 455/112, Annex, 12, U.N. Doc.
A/45/49 (Dec. 14, 1990) (emphasizing efforts to preserve the integrity of the
family, including the extended family, should be pursued).
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consistently failed to respect this principle of international law. The
next section explores how regional organizations and other national
governments have used international human rights instruments,
including the CRC, to extend protections to "functional" families.
A. Implementation of International Children's Rights
Instruments
1. Europe
The Council of Europe, which was founded in 1949 to develop
common and democratic human rights principles throughout Europe,
has extended protections to functional families through several
international instruments, including the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Human Rights Convention)'1 8 and the Convention on the Exercise of
Children's Rights (CECR)." 9 Applying Article 8 of the European
Human Rights Convention, the European Court of Human Rights
addressed the rights of a functional or extended family in Bronda v.
Italy.120 In that case, a child's grandparents, with whom she had
formerly lived, had sought her return from a foster home. The court
found that the interference with family life prohibited under Article
8(1) of the European Human Rights Convention12 1 included
interference in the relationship between a child and her
grandparents. In this case, however, the court held that the
determining factor was the best interests of the child, who had
settled into her place in the foster family and did not want to leave.
In another case, 22 the court applied Article 8 to an applicant who
sought access to his nephew. Although the case eventually settled,
the court had the opportunity to explain that the relationship
between an uncle and his nephew could in certain cases fall within
118. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (as amended by
Protocol No. 11) [hereinafter European Human Rights Covention].
119. Council of Europe, Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights,
Jan. 25, 1996, Europ. T.S. No. 160 [hereinafter CERCI. This convention was
specifically designed to address procedural matters arising from the enactment of
the CRC.
120. Bronda v. Italy, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 (1998).
121. "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence." European Human Rights Convention, supra note
118, art. 8(1).
122. Boyle v. the United Kingdom, 282-B Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) (1994).
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the concept of "family life" for purposes of Article 8 of the European
Human Rights Convention and therefore be entitled to protection
from interference.
Like the European Human Rights Convention, the CECR
extends protections to functional families. Instead of referring
exclusively to "parents," the CECR refers to "holders of parental
responsibilities," which are defined as "parents and other persons or
bodies entitled to exercise some or all parental responsibilities."2 3
The Council of Europe also extended protections to functional
families in 2003 when it promulgated the Convention on Contact
Concerning Children. 24 The Preamble states that one of its goals is
"to establish co-operation between central authorities and other
bodies in order to promote and improve contact between children and
their parents, and other persons having family ties with children."'25
"Family ties" are defined in Article 2(d) as "a close relationship such
as between a child and his or her grandparents or siblings, based on
law or on a de facto family relationship."12 6 This definition of "family
ties" extends family and children's rights to protect functional
families and shows that European international organizations are
moving towards the CRC's definition of family.
2. The Americas
In the Americas, the rights of the child derive primarily from
the American Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention) 27 and the Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador).121 The Inter-American
123. CERC, supra note 119, art. 2(b).
124. Convention on Contact Concerning Children, opened for signature
May 15, 2003, Europ. T.S. No. 192 (entered into force Sept. 1, 2005).
125. Id. pmbl.
126. Id. art. 2(d) (emphasis added).
127. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1969, art. 19, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 150 (entered into force July
18, 1978) ("Every minor child has the right to the measures of protection required
by his condition as a minor on the part of his family, society, and the state.").
128. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 16, opened for signature
Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (entered into force November 16, 1999),
available at http'/www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-52.html ("Every child,
whatever his parentage, has the right to the protection that his status as a minor
requires from his family, society and the State.").
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Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights have also used the CRC as a reference in defining the
protection granted by the American Convention to children. In the
"Street Children Case," for example, the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights construed Article 19 of the American Convention by
reference to Articles 2, 3, 6, 20, 27, and 37 of the CRC stating that:
Both the American Convention and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child form part of a very comprehensive
international corpusjuris for the protection of the child that
should help this Court establish the content and scope of
the general provision established in Article 19 of the
American Convention.
12 9
In 2001, at the request of the American Commission on
Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued an
Advisory Opinion on the Juridical Status and Rights of the Human
Child. 30 The goal of the request was to establish "limits to the good
judgment and discretion of the States" with respect to children and
also to establish "general and valid criteria on this matter in
conformance to the framework of the American Convention." 3 '
In issuing its advisory opinion, the court determined that it
could use the CRC in the interpretation of the American Convention
and other international treaties. 32 The court also adopted a number
of the provisions of the CRC, including the "best interests of the
child" standard, 33 the centrality of the family (including the
European Court's decisions concerning "de facto 'family' ties where
the parties are living together outside of marriage"),'3 4  the
prohibition of official interference with the right to family life, 135 the
principle that a child and his or her family cannot be separated
129. Villagrdn Morales et al. Case, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63,
at 46 (Nov. 19, 1999), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/
casos/articulos/seriec_63_ing.pdf. See also Alan Felipe Da Silva, Leonardo Santos
Da Silva, Rodrigo Da Guia Martins Figueiredo Tavares et al. v. Brazil, Case
665.05, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/07,.OEA/Ser. L/WVII.130, doc. 22 rev. 1,
1 n.2 (2007) (in which the court used the definition of "child" in the CRC to
determine whether petitioners were "children" under the terms of the American
Convention).
130. IACtHR Advisory Opinion 17, supra note 95.
131. Id. at 1.
132. Id. at 51.
133. Id. at 78.
134. Id. at 60-61 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 61 ("Every person's right to receive protection against arbitrary
or illegal interference with his or her family is implicitly a part of the right to
protection of the family and the child. .. ").
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except where it is in the best interests of the child, 36 the right of due
process in judicial and administrative matters where decisions are
made on the rights of children,3 3 and the right of due process where
a child is accused of a crime. 1"8
Further focus on the rights of the child and the variety of
family structures came at the Nineteenth Pan American Child
Congress held in Mexico City in 2004, which was convened on the
anniversary of the adoption of the CRC. This congress was convened
by the Inter-American Children's Institute-a specialized
organization of the Organization of American States (OAS)-and
involved participants from national governments, non-governmental
organizations, and academia. The main theme of the congress in
2004 was, "The Family: Basis for the Integral Development of
Children and Adolescents," and the third sub-theme was, "Children's
Rights and their Relation to the Different Types of Families."' The
goal of the congress was to provide a clearinghouse for the exchange
of information, experience and expertise, and to address and analyze
policies with the ultimate goal of contributing to the progress of child
policies in the Americas. The Declaration of the Nineteenth Pan
American Child Congress suggests conducting technical studies on
the rights of children and their families and refers to "the
heterogeneity and cultural diversity that characterizes the countries
in the region [which] bring about a variety of family structures and
organizations .... ,140 This declaration emphasizes that every child
has a right to a stable familial institution, that states have an
obligation to support and strengthen the family unit, and that states
must "protect the integrity of the family in order to enable it to
perform its social role of protection and respect for children's
rights."'4'
136. Id. at 62 ("Any decision pertaining to the separation of the child from
his or her family must be justified by the best interests of the child.").
137. Id. at 70-71 ("Protection measures adopted by administrative
authorities must be strictly in accordance with the law and must seek
continuation of the child's ties with his or her family group, if this is possible and
reasonable . . . All this enables adequate development of due process . .. ").
138. Id. at 73. ("As regards the subject matter we are now addressing, the
rules of due process ... safeguard the rights of children subject to various actions
by the State, society, or the family.").
139. Declaration of the Nineteenth Pan Am. Child Cong. 1-2 (2004),
http://www.iin.oea.org/IIN/English/PdfXIXcpn/IINDEC_XIXCen.pdf.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 1.
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3. The United States
Unlike regional international courts and courts in other
countries, courts in the United States have not embraced the CRC.
The Fifth Circuit has explicitly refused to apply the CRC to U.S.
immigration law and has also refused to apply "customary
international law" such as the UDHR where a "controlling legislative
act" occupies the field. 142 Similarly, the Second Circuit rejected the
argument that the CRC is binding as "customary international law"
where Congress had already "enacted legislation defining the
circumstances under which hardship to a child may appropriately be
considered as a ground for granting relief from removal to a
nonpermanent resident alien."43 The Eighth Circuit also refused to
consider the CRC where "Congress has clearly expressed in the INA
its intent to remove certain aliens, as in this instance, without a
separate consideration of the impact of that removal upon the alien's
children .. 144
Despite the widespread rejection of the CRC in the United
States, at least one circuit has acknowledged its relevance to U.S.
immigration law. In Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the CRC is not the law of the land because the United
States has not ratified it, but "assume[d], without deciding that the
[CRCI ha[d] attained the status of 'customary international law.'' 145
The court went on to consider whether the Department of Justice's
interpretation of the hardship standard in IRRIRA contravenes the
142. Martinez-Lopez v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 500, 502-03 (5th Cir. 2006).
143. Oliva v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 233-34 (2d Cir. 2005).
144. Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 2005).
145. Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).
Professors Jacqueline BhaBha and Wendy Young explain the implications of the
CRC obtaining the status of customary international law: "Any framework for the
adjudication of children's asylum claims must consider the provisions of
international human rights instruments. These instruments have become
increasingly important in interpreting the obligations of states towards their
citizens and, by extension, the obligations of host states toward individuals
seeking asylum. The INS recognizes that such instruments are relevant to the
evaluation of asylum claims, and that even if the United States has not ratified a
particular treaty, it may still be bound if the provisions have acquired the status of
customary international law." Jacqueline BhaBha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in
Miniature: Unaccompanied Child Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines, 11 Int'l J.
Refugee L. 84, 93 (1999) (emphasis added). See also LN.S., The Basic Law
Manual: U.S. Law and INS Refugee/Asylum Adjudications 12 (1994) (stating that
"treaties to which the United States is not a party, while not legally binding, can
be evidence of customary international law").
HeinOnline  -- 41 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 548 2009-2010
2010] IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE NUCLEAR FAMILY 549
CRC.'46 The court held that the interpretation did not violate the
CRC, so the discussion of the CRC is dictum; however, the fact that
the Ninth Circuit entertained the CRC as customary international
law for purposes of argument suggests that the CRC may be
emerging as a force in U.S. immigration law.'47
Despite the Ninth Circuit's analysis, however, the reality is
that several federal circuits have refused to grant the CRC the status
of customary international law. As we saw in Section I, the courts
have simply deferred to Congress to define "family" for the purpose of
immigration law:
Though this result-separating five U.S. citizen children
from their grandfather, who appears to be their only loving
and stable source of care and support-may seem unduly
harsh and perhaps illogical, it is the result dictated by law.
Congress is of course free to correct any inequities resulting
from our application of its plain statutory language, as it
has done in the past.1 48
Unfortunately, for matters relating to immigration, Congress has
consistently relied on a definition of family which conflicts with
international law and is unduly harsh, illogical, and contrary to the
best interests of children.
146. Cabrera-Alvarez, 423 F.3d at 1010-13. The issue befGre the court was
the interpretation and application of the "best interests" standard in Article 3 of
the convention; this case did not explicitly involve a child's right to be raised in
the context of her family.
147. An example of the emergence of the CRC in U.S. law generally is the
landmark juvenile death penalty case Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In
Roper, the 2005 decision that struck down the death penalty for juveniles, Justice
Anthony Kennedy explained that "[tlhe opinion of the world community, while
not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation
for our own conclusions." Id. at 578. In assessing the opinion of the world
community, the Court noted that the CRC "contains an express prohibition on
capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18." Id. at 576.
148. Moreno-Morante v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007). For
more discussion of the effect of U.S. immigration law's definition of family on
mixed-status families, see infra Part III.B.
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III. WHY U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW SHOULD CONFORM TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INCLUDE A FUNCTIONAL
DEFINITION OF FAMILY
Certainly, international law contemplates a state's right to
define family for itself:
The Committee notes that the concept of the family may
differ in some respects from State to State, and even from
region to region within a State, and that it is therefore not
possible to give the concept a standard definition. However,
the Committee emphasizes that, when a group of persons is
regarded as a family under the legislation and practice of a
State, it must be given the protection referred to in article
23. 149
In the United States, we do recognize that extended families are
entitled to constitutional rights. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,5 '
for example, a plurality of the Supreme Court found that a zoning
ordinance limiting the definition of "family members" to nuclear
families infringed upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court explained that the "sanctity of the family"
must be respected based on the "teachings of history [and] the solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society."1 5 ' Writing
the plurality opinion, Justice Powell reasoned:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the
bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and
children has roots venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition. Over the years millions of our
citizens have grown up in just such an environment, and
most, surely, have profited from it.152
In a concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall observed
that "[t]he Constitution cannot be interpreted . . . to tolerate the
149. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 19: Article 23 (The
Family) Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the
Spouses, 2, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/l/Rev.1 (July 27, 1990).
150. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977).
151. Id. at 495.
152. Id. at 504-05 (citation omitted).
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imposition by government upon the rest of us of white suburbia's
preference in patterns of family living."'
Scholars have acknowledged that U.S. constitutional law
protects the unity of "extended family" by protecting family ties
between "persons bound together by marriage and kinship ties," as
well as de facto parent-child relationships that may exist, for
153. Id. at 506-08. The Supreme Court has long accorded constitutional
protection to family relationships, not only safeguarding existing relationships
from intrusion--e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494-95 (1968)
(noting that the Court has acknowledged the "private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter")-but also preventing the erection of barriers to their
formation-e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (finding that the
right to marry is a "central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause"). Similarly, the Court has recognized that in our history and traditions,
there is a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter," Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), and that "the child is not the mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). "[Iun the
culture and traditions of the Nation," the Court has found, it is families that
assume a primary role in "cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs;
they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual
and the power of the State." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19. See
also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (state-imposed collective
rearing of children would do violence to the letter and spirit of Constitution). In
short, in the United States it is clear that family relationships are seen as critical
to the independent formation of one's core beliefs and ideals, and receive
constitutional protection in order to safeguard the freedom of self-definition that
is "central to any concept of liberty." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. See also Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972) (describing the importance of family and
family bonds); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (describing
parent-child relationship as "far more precious than any property right"). The
Court has supported so-called non-traditional family forms. See, e.g., Moore, 431
U.S. 504-05 (finding constitutional protection for extended families); Smith v.
Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (noting
that "[n]o one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and independent
relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in the
absence of a blood relationship"). But many courts have found no constitutional
rights are implicated when a citizen's noncitizen family members are excluded
from the United States or not allowed to remain. See, e.g., Perdido v. I.N.S., 420
F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding no deprivation of a citizen child's
constitutional right where the noncitizen parents were ordered deported);
Gonzales-Cuevas v. I.N.S., 515 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
deportation orders to noncitizen parents do not violate any constitutional right of
citizen children). For a response to those who argue that the Constitution should
apply in the context of immigration see Augustine-Adams, supra note 87, at 712
(noting the difficulty in grounding constitutional protections for noncitizens in
the U.S. Constitution because it says little, if anything, about noncitizens).
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example, between a child and a grandmother.'54 The Court has
established that such family ties are protected against state
intervention by the highest levels of scrutiny derived from due
process considerations.'55 However, in the context of immigration
law, the Court has applied the most minimal levels of scrutiny to
state activity. 156
Although courts in the United States recognize that the
constitutional right to family extends to functional families, these
same courts explicitly deny these rights to extended families subject
to immigration law. As Professor Trucios-Haynes concludes, the
concept of the "immediate family" in immigration law is a narrow
definition of family "at odds with the constitutional protection for
extended families under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." She explains, however, that courts have upheld the
narrow definition of family under the plenary power of Congress to
legislate on immigration matters.157
154. John Guendelsberger, Implementing Family Unification Rights in
American Immigration Law: Proposed Amendments, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 253,
265 (1988) (discussing the importance of family unification for members of the
nuclear family in the area of immigration law).
155. Id. at 264-66.
156. Id. at 266-68.
157. Enid Trucios-Haynes, "Family Values" 1990's Style: U.S. Immigration
Reform Proposals and the Abandonment of the Family, 36 Brandeis J. Faro. L.
241, 243-246 (Spring 1997-1998) (examining how restrictive immigration reform
proposals affecting family unity are at odds with the constitutional values,
economic interests, and the emerging transnational identity of the United
States). Congress exercised its plenary power over immigration in the nineteenth
century through the Chinese Exclusion Acts. The Exclusion Acts and cases
upholding them gave birth to the plenary power doctrine. Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1983) (holding that the power "to exclude or to
expel aliens" is "vested in the political departments of the government"); Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 629 (1889) (holding that Congress has
the power to exclude aliens from U.S. territory for any sufficient reason); see also
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976 ) ("In the exercise of its broad power
over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would
be unacceptable if applied to citizens."). There are a number of scholars who have
criticized the plenary power doctrine. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to
the Constitution (1996) (asserting that the government should not be free to
deport aliens on constitutionally suspect grounds); Linda S. Bosniak,
Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev,
1047, 1091-92 (1994) ("Whatever rationales support it, the plenary power
doctrine has often had distressing real-life consequences ... for years, scholars
have characterized the plenary power doctrine as a national embarrassment and
have called for its abandonment by the courts."); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's
Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of
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So, if Congress has plenary power to narrowly define family
for the purpose of regulating immigration, and the CRC is not
binding on U.S. courts, of what moment is it that U.S. immigration
laws conflict with the well-established right to family, including the
functional family, as set out in the CRC?
As is emphasized throughout this Article, we should care that
our immigration law conflicts with the well-established right to
family because we are falling behind the human rights standards set
by the rest of the world. But there are additional compelling reasons
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1998) (arguing that the plenary power doctrine
should be reexamined because the foundational cases are unsound); Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853 (1987) (arguing that the plenary
power of Congress is subject to constitutional restraints and should be exercised
in accordance with international law); Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental
Right to Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community
Ties in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens' Rights, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 725
(1996) (arguing that unbridled deference to the plenary power of Congress has
had inhumane results and has violated the fundamental right of family unity of
many who are subject to U.S. immigration law); Stephen H. Legomsky,
Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 255 (1985) (analyzing and criticizing the plenary power doctrine); Philip
Monrad, Comment, Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 Cal. L.
Rev. 831, 916 (1989) (arguing that the plenary power should be abandoned and
"is an affront to the constitutional values of a free and tolerant society"); Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545, 549 (1990)
(arguing for a "direct and candid reassessment of plenary power as constitutional
doctrine"); Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of
Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v.
Albright, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (1999) (discussing the indeterminacy of the
Constitution and the plenary power doctrine); Victor C. Romero, The Congruence
Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of Federal Alienage
Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 76 Or. L. Rev. 425
(1997) (arguing for a narrower plenary power doctrine that would balance
deference to important governmental power and the protection of individual
rights); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L.
Rev. 965 (1993) (questioning the Court's adherence to the plenary power doctrine
through internationally changing norms); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens
Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary
Power Doctrine, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1087 (1995) (arguing for the
abandonment of the plenary power doctrine and discussing its incompatibility
with international human rights); Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A
Moderate Proposal for Immigration Reform, 7 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 35, 35 (1996)
(arguing that the Court should abolish the plenary power doctrine, a doctrine
from "an era of constitutional theory which has been superseded in almost all
other respects").
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why we should care that U.S. immigration law conflicts with the
well-established right to family: (1) doing so interferes with the vital
interest of children to be raised in a secure and stable family
relationship, and (2) these laws have a devastating impact on mixed-
status families. After discussing these reasons, this Article explores
some concerns raised by adopting a functional approach to defining
family.
A. The Vital Interest of Children in a Secure and Stable
Family Relationship
It is well-established that to develop into autonomous,
socially competent, responsible, and well-adjusted adults, children
require a secure and stable family relationship. Child-development
research shows that children form strong bonds of attachment to
their parents early in life, which strengthen and develop as children
grow older. 58 These attachment relationships do not depend on
biological connection, but form with adults who "on a continuing,
day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay and
mutuality, [fulfill] the child's psychological needs, as well as the
child's physical needs." 159 It is through such relationships-which
require a "reciprocal, enduring, emotional, and physical affiliation
between a child and caregiver [that children] form their concepts of
self, others and the world."'
60
Thus, a child should not be separated from a parental figure
just because that person is not their biological parent--doing so can
have extremely detrimental effects on a child. Scientific research
supports this conclusion. For example, in its report, From Neurons to
Neighborhoods: The Science of Early Childhood Development, the
National Research Council and Institute of Medicine found that
attachment relationships "shape the development of self-awareness,
social competence, conscience, emotional growth and emotional
regulation, learning and cognitive growth."1 6' This report also found
158. See, e.g., 1 John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss: Attachment 198-209
(1st ed. 1969) (examining the nature of a child's attachment to his or her mother).
159. Joseph Goldstein, et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 98 (2d
ed. 1979) [hereinafter Beyond the Best Interests]
160. Beverly James, Handbook for Treatment of Attachment-Trauma
Problems in Children 2 (1994).
161. National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, From Neurons
to Neighborhoods: The Science of Early Childhood Development 265 (Jack P.
Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000).
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that these relationships "buffer young children against the
development of serious behavior problems, in part by strengthening
the human connections and providing the structure and monitoring
that curb violent or aggressive tendencies." 62  Similarly, the
American Academy of Pediatrics has found that "[a]ttachment to a
primary caregiver is essential to the development of emotional
security and social conscience. 163 And, David M. Brodzinsky, a highly
regarded researcher, educator, author, and expert in the area of child
development and psychology has found that attachment relationships
form "the cornerstone for healthy psychological adjustment. " 164
It is the separation from a parental figure that can cause a
child profound emotional and psychological harm. And, it is well
known that disruption in primary attachment relationships causes
children separation anxiety as well as more difficulty in forming
162. Id.
163. American Academy of Pediatrics: Committee on Early Childhood,
Adoption, and Dependent Care, Development Issues for Young Children in Foster
Care, 106 Pediatrics 1145, 1146 (2000).
164. David M. Brodzinsky et al., Children's Adjustment to Adoption:
Developmental and Clinical Issues 13 (Sage Publications 1998). The research on
the importance of attachment relationships is exhaustive. See, e.g., R.A.
Thompson & R. Goodvin, The Individual Child: Temperament, Emotion, Self and
Personality, in Developmental Science: An Advanced Textbook 391, 414 (M.
Bornstein & M. Lamb. eds., 2005) (A "secure parent-infant attachment" also
provides "a crucial foundation for the growth of healthy self-regard, because of its
influence on the young child's developing self-representations."); Nat'l Scientific
Council on the Developing Child, Working Paper #1: Young Children Develop in
an Environment of Relationships 1 (2004), available at
http://developingchild.harvard.edu/initiatives/council/publications/ (noting that
primary caregiver attachment relationships "engage children . . . in ways that
help them define who they are, what they can become, and how and why they are
important to other people."); L. Alan Sroufe, Attachment and Development: A
Prospective, Longitudinal Study from Birth to Adulthood, 7 Attachment & Hum.
Dev. 349, 365 (2005) ("Attachment experiences," are "vital to the formation of the
person."). This research includes evidence of the importance of attachment
relationships to the development of the brain. See, e.g., Nat'l Scientific Council on
the Developing Child, The Science of Early Childhood Development: Closing the
Gap Between What We Know and What We Do 6 (2007) available at
http://developingchild.harvard.edu/initiatives/council/publications/ ("Decades of
research tell us that mutually rewarding interactions are essential prerequisites
to the development of healthy brain circuits . . . ."); Daniel J. Seigel, The
Developing Mind: Toward a Neurobiology of Interpersonal Experience 67-120
(The Guilford Press, 1999) (examining attachment relationships and highlighting
how these relationships affect children's development later in life).
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subsequent attachments.'6 5 Interference with children's attachment
relationships can lead to aggression, problems in school, and
"elevated psychopathology."166
In short, the scientific evidence is clear, compelling, and
undisputed. Because primary attachment relationships are so critical
to a child's cognitive, emotional, social, and psychological
development, and because disruption of those attachment
relationships impairs the child's ability to form future attachments,
it follows that children need security and stability in their family
relationships and should not be separated from adults who act as
their parents, whether or not those parental figures are biologically
or legally related to the child.
B. Impact on Mixed-Status Families
While there is no principled reason to distinguish American-
citizen children from non-American citizen children when it comes to
protecting their human rights, the reality of the political debate in
the United States is that the fate of American-citizen children is
considered more compelling. This reality is reflected in a recent New
York Times story on mixed-status families, that is, families in which
at least one family member has legal status in the United States and
at least one family member does not. 167 This section briefly discusses
the impact of U.S. immigration law on these families.
165. Beyond the Best Interests, supra note 159, at 33. ("When infants and
young children find themselves abandoned by the parent, they not only suffer
separation distress and anxiety but also setbacks in the quality of their next
attachments, which will be less trustful ... They tend to grow up as persons who
lack warmth in their contact with fellow beings.").
166. Ana H. Marty et al., Supporting Secure Parent-Child Attachments:
The Role of the Non-Parental Caregiver, 175 Early Childhood Dev. & Care 271,
274 (2005).
167. David Gonzalez, A Family Divided By 2 Worlds, Legal and Illegal,
N.Y. Times, April 25, 2009, at Al, available at
httpJ/www.nytimes.con/2009/04126/nyregion/26immig.html (Last visited Nov. 13,
2009). An April 14, 2009 Pew Report, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in
the United States, defines mixed-status families as families made up of
unauthorized immigrants and their U.S. citizen children; but the report finds
that these families also include a significant number of people in the household
who are not the biological parents of these children. Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera
Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States, Pew Hispanic
Center 8 (2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf
[hereinafter Pew Report 2009]. In this report, for example, the authors find that
out of 4.5 million children in mixed-status families, 4.0 million are children born
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It has been widely recognized that the line between
"American families" and "immigrant families" is blurred. 68 Three
types of families can be identified on the basis of immigration status:
families with legal immigration status, families with undocumented
or unauthorized status, and families whose status is mixed.
In the first case, as noted above, legal immigration status has
typically been obtained through family petition provisions. "As of
2004, 75 percent of the workload for United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) officials was family-based,"1 69 and in
2006, 66 percent of legal immigration to the United States was
attributable to family related visas.
70
In the second case, undocumented families have been
described as those "composed entirely of persons [living in the United
States] without authorized immigration status," and have been
estimated at four to five million. 17' As a consequence, based on
in the United States; while many of these children live with their undocumented
parents, there are at least 400,000 adults also living in these households. Id. This
data, of course, does not reflect situations in which a child's primary caregiver
does not live in the household itself, or is not related to the child.
168. See Pew Report 2009, supra note 167, at 8 (discussing "mixed-status"
families). David B. Thronson, You Can't Get Here From Here: Toward A More
Child-Centered Immigration Law, 14 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 58, 64 (2006) (finding
that mixed-status families are "remarkably widespread," and "the permutations
of immigration status in mixed families are myriad") [hereinafter Thronson, You
Can't Get Here From Here].
169. Jan H. Brown, Temporal Trends in Family Immigration, 1446
PLI/Corp 265, 271 (2004) (discussing predominance of family-sponsored cases in
USCIS workload).
170. Kelly Jefferys and Randall Monger, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Report: U.S. Legal Permanent
Residents: 2007 3 (2008), available at http//www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/IS-4496_LPRFlowReport 04vaccessible.pdf.
Of the 1,266,264 total admissions as permanent residents, 803,335 were through
the family-sponsored program. Id. In Fiscal Year 1998, 80% of legal immigration
took place through family related visas. Michael Fix et al., Immigration Studies:
The Integration of Immigrant Families in the United States 7-8 (The Urban
Institute, 2001), available at http'//www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/immig
_integration.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2010) as cited in David B. Thronson, You
Can't Get Here From Here, supra note 168, at 62-63.
171. While not explicitly defined in the Pew Center Report, the term
"family" as used here appears to reflect a traditional western definition of family.
The Pew report defines "Unauthorized-Immigrant Households," as households in
which "either the householder, spouse or partner (if any) or both are
unauthorized immigrants," and estimates that there are 4.7 million of these
households. See Pew Report 2009, supra note 167, at vii, 35.
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current estimates, undocumented children represent 13 percent of
the undocumented population in the United States.
72
In the third case, families have been defined as "mixed-
status" families, or as "families in which all family members do not
share the same immigration status or citizenship."1 7 3 It has been
estimated that 73 percent of the children in families headed by a
noncitizen are U.S. citizens by birth.1 74 More to the point, "of the
entire population of the United States, one of every ten children now
lives in a mixed-status family."' 75 A 2009 report released by the Pew
Hispanic Center shows that four million children with U.S.
citizenship are the children of undocumented parents. 1
76
Under current immigration laws, one reason that American
citizens may care about the fate of immigrant families is that there
are many American citizens who are in mixed-status families. In
other words, under current immigration policy, American citizen
children are vulnerable to separation from their noncitizen family
members.'7 7
172. Pew Report 2009, supra note 167, at 5. As is discussed below, the vast
majority of children of undocumented immigrants (and LPRs) are born in the
United States.
173. Thronson, You Can't Get Here From Here, supra note 168, at 64; the
author explains: "[D]ifferences in family size and composition, together with the
permutations of undocumented status and a multiplicity of legal immigration and
citizenship statuses, create confounding variations on the theme of 'mixed-status'
families. This mix creates confusion in sorting out societal obligations and
treatment of immigrant families, as immigrants in the United States are not an
isolated and discrete population that can be easily culled from the general
population. Through family, immigrants are thoroughly integrated into the
national fabric." Id. at 65.
174. Pew Report 2009, supra note 167, at ii. The authors of the Pew Report
estimate this number to be at four million in 2008, compared to 2.7 million in
2003.
175. Thronson, You Can't Get Here From Here, supra note 168, at 64.
Thronson continues: "[Olver three million U.S. citizen children in the United
States live in approximately two million families where at least one parent is not
authorized to remain in the country. In some such families, all the children are
U.S. citizens, while in other families, siblings do not share a common immigration
or citizenship status. In families where a parent is not authorized to remain in
the United States, almost two-thirds of all children are U.S. citizens, meaning
that the remaining one third of children in such families hold no legal
immigration status or a status short of citizenship." Id. at 65.
176. Pew Report 2009, supra note 167, at 8.
177. Thronson, You Can't Get Here From Here, supra note 168, at
74-76, 82.
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The most common understanding of mixed-status families, of
course, is an undocumented biological parent who gives birth to a
child in the United States, thereby creating a mixed-status family.' 8
But given that families may immigrate together and given that a
primary caretaker for the child of an immigrant family may not
always be the biological parent, immigration laws that do not
recognize in loco parentis relationships may make American citizen
children in these families vulnerable to separation from their
primary caretaker who (in addition to their biological parent) does
not have legal status.
179
Unfortunately for the children in some mixed-status families,
U.S. immigration law focuses on regulating and channeling the
individual immigrant, without consideration for the welfare of the
child or the integrity of the family unit.'8 ° As discussed above, the
problem, in essence, lies in how immigration law defines the unit of
family. Again, "[wlestern democracies have conceived of 'family' as a
nuclear family, consisting of mother, father and one or more
(biological or adopted) minor children."'"' This ideal nuclear family
excludes other prevalent family configurations, such as in loco
parentis relationships, single-parent households, grandparent-
grandchild households, same-sex couples, polygamous marriages,
178. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
all children born in the United States are granted citizenship. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Constitution's
granting of so-called "birthright citizenship" applies without regard to the legal
status of the children's parents-so, for example, children born to parents who
are living in the United States but are undocumented are United States citizens.
For a discussion of this rule and challenges to it see Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 54 (1997)
(discussing challenges to birthright citizenship and defending the constitutional
principle).
179. Of course, if a child's primary caretaker were her biological parent,
this connection would also be placed in jeopardy by virtue of a family's mixed-
status. The main point in this section is that there are American citizen children
who may be affected by immigration laws that reflect a western notion of family,
due, in part, to the law's failure to recognize in loco parentis relationships. It is
also true, of course, that even if in loco parentis relationships were recognized,
the person would still have to be eligible to stay in the United States on some
specific ground. While it is the view of the author that these grounds should be
expanded, that argument is beyond the scope of this Article and is not addressed
here.
180. Demleitner, supra note 12, at 276.
181. Id. at 290.
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and extended family configurations "in which... relatives and non-
relatives, live in the household, either in addition to or instead of the
expected nuclear family members."'12 Most fundamentally, this
"ideal" family unit reflected in the INA negates the validity of in loco
parentis relationships, without regard for the welfare of children.
Scholars have recognized the vulnerability of mixed-status
families to separation, due to legislative and policy shifts between
"extremes of openness to newcomers and nativist exclusion."8 3 Shifts
in recent years have favored a policy of "attrition," whereby
immigrants give up and deport themselves when confronted with
heavy-handed methods of immigration enforcement. 84 This policy
shift has translated into dramatic large-scale immigration raids in
homes and workplaces with the supposed purpose of picking up
immigrants with outstanding criminal records or deportation
orders.'8 5 The raids have led to the removal of large numbers of
undocumented immigrants, whether or not they have outstanding
arrests or deportation orders, but have also met the underlying goal
of instilling panic, trauma, and crisis in families and children
suddenly faced with the removal of a parent.' 86 Advocates of
"attrition" should know, however, that a "case study found that sixty-
182. Id.; see also 273-74, 279-82.
183. David B. Thronson, Creating Crisis: Immigration Raids and the
Destabilization of Immigrant Families, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 391, 393 (2007)
[hereinafter Thronson, Creating Crisis].
184. "The basic idea of attrition advocates is that '[bly deterring the
settlement of new illegals, by increasing deportations to the extent possible, and,
most importantly, by increasing the number of illegals already here who give up
and deport themselves . .. [the result would be a shrinking of the illegal
population to a manageable nuisance.' The predicted 'self-deportations' are to
come as 'an increase in conventional enforcement-arrests, prosecutions,
deportations, asset seizures, etc.-with expanded use of verification of legal
status at a variety of important points.., make it as difficult and unpleasant as
possible to live here illegally.' Advocates of attrition note that under this
approach it is 'true that random raids at workplaces and elsewhere will always be
needed as an enforcement tool (like speed traps or random tax audits, in other
contexts), because every illegal alien must understand that he may be detained at
any time.'" Id. at 402-03 (quoting Mark Krikorian, Downsizing Illegal
Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition Through Enforcement, CIS Backgrounder
(Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Wash., D.C.), May 2005, at 2, available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back605.pdf).
185. Id. at 398-99.
186. Id. at 400-05.
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six percent of children with a parent arrested in a workplace raid
were U.S. citizens."8 7
In addition, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA) causes family disintegration by establishing that
detainees must be sent to jails, processing centers, temporary tent
cities, or detention centers.18 8 Those sent to detention centers remain
there, from a few months to several years, without counsel, in places
far removed from their family's residence, until their deportation
process is complete. 18 9 Once removed, deportees may face additional
punitive conditions and assimilation challenges, not to mention
family separation. It appears that deportation is being used as a
second-tier punitive system by Congress for immigrants; removal is a
severe punishment that neither corresponds to the act, nor justifies
the destruction of the family unity.'9° Thus, in a fundamental way,
immigration law fails to acknowledge that immigrants are more
fluidly assimilated into society if they can migrate with their
families. These laws also separate children from their family
members and disregard the rights of children in mixed-status
families.
This section has explored why we should care about the well-
established right of a child to live with her family. Now that this
question has been addressed, perhaps the question should be framed
this way: why shouldn't U.S. immigration law define family in a way
that includes functional families and thereby furthers the best
interests of children? Where the intent of U.S. immigration law is to
protect family unity for the sake of children's best interests, why does
it make sense to place artificial limitations on what constitutes a
family? These questions are addressed below by exploring some likely
counterarguments.
C. Overcoming the Problems of a Functional Approach
Including a functional definition of "parent" and "child" in
immigration law will bring certain difficulties. Some criticism will
focus on the fact that a functional definition will increase
immigration. Although any related increase in the number of
187. Id. at 405.
188. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Lonegan, American
Diaspora, supra note 1, at 66-68.
189. Lonegan, American Diaspora, supra note 1, at 66-70.
190. Id. at 70-73.
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immigrants who enter or remain in the United States is likely to be
relatively small, this Article takes as a given that more individuals
will be eligible to immigrate to the United States under a functional
approach. The Article does not discuss the benefits or criticisms of
more open immigration policies generally, but notes that substantial
scholarship exists on this issue.1 91 What is important to emphasize
here is that honoring the rights of children is worth whatever
tradeoff critics say will come from an increase in the number of
individuals who can immigrate legally to the United States.
Other concerns will arise relating to what Professor Martha
Minow refers to as the messiness of functional definitions, namely:
less predictability, intrusive judicial examination, and inevitably
inconsistent outcomes.'92 Professor Minow asks: if we use a
191. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Federal Immigration Law and the Case for
Open Entry, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1265, 1266 n.11 (1994) (arguing for an open
borders policy); Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 193 (2003)
(making a case for considering more open borders); Elizabeth M. Bruch, Open or
Closed: Balancing Border Policy with Human Rights, 96 Ky. L.J. 197, 199 (2007-
2008) (arguing that "an evolved understanding of the role of sovereignty in
international law, and in particular its relationship to human rights, also offers
the possibility of a radical reevaluation of immigration policy that would remove
many of the current limitations on immigration-'opening' the borders.");
Developments in the Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 Harv.
L. Rev. 1286, 1338 (1983) ("[V]irtually all experts concede the necessity of setting
some limits on immigration . . . ."); Gary S. Becker, The Migration of People,
Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society (1992) (as cited in
Christopher J. Coyne, Institutions, Immigrations, and Identity, 2 NYU J. L. &
Liberty 131, 151 n.49 (2006)) (questioning an open immigration policy because of
its potential to drain welfare resources); Open Borders? Closed Societies? The
Ethical and Political Issues (Mark Gibney ed., 1988) (discussing the political and
moral philosophy that should be contemplated in shaping immigration policy).
192. Professor Minow articulates two additional problems with using a
functional approach to define family. The first, which she discusses only briefly,
has to do with what she describes as the "suspicious pedigree" of functional
approaches. More specifically, there is literature that finds a connection between
analysis of 'family functions and social thought," or as Minow describes, the
kinds of "intellectual work that also brought us Social Darwinism, eugenics, and
programs of governmental intrusion into and control over the lives of immigrants,
racial minorities and poor people." Another concern Professor Minow raises with
using a functional approach in this area is the government assigning family-like
status to "punish people or deny them benefits for which they would otherwise be
eligible." Thus, Professor Minow sees an important distinction between family
form chosen by participants and one used by the government to achieve its own
ends. Minow provides a number of examples of this last concern, one of which was
when the Department of Housing and Urban Development adopted a regulation
that allowed the eviction of any family member suspected of engaging in certain
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functional approach to define family, might we then only be able to
predict that the results will be unpredictable, 93 or might our
predictions be only as good as our understanding of a particular
judge's conception of family? And, in response to the suggestion that
more specific rules that reflect functional family relationships should
be proposed, not only might these rules create their own kind of
unpredictability,1 94 as Minow suggests, but these rules will also
necessarily exclude some in loco parentis relationships in which an
adult is acting as a parent to a child. In the context of immigration
policy, however, some unpredictability is preferable to the
alternative, which is automatically prohibiting functional families
from immigrating to the United States as a family unit. And in other
contexts, as Professor Barbara Woodhouse explains, concerns
regarding indeterminacy can be overcome since courts are
particularly equipped to interpret ambiguous terms.195 Fortunately,
the U.S. immigration system is also equipped to make such
determinations. 96 In fact, immigration officers and administrative
judges are tasked with making fact-specific determinations every
day. In the same way that the government determines whether a
person's removal would cause "extreme hardship" to a United States
citizen, it could determine whether a child's aunt or grandfather
"functions" as a parent.
The functionalist approach may also be less troublesome for
parent-child relationships than for adult-adult relationships 97
because there is more likely to be a consensus over criteria adults
must meet to be considered parental figures than concensus over the
criminal activity. This concern is less pressing in the immigration context
because U.S. immigration laws do not contain provisions that punish individuals
based on their family affiliations. Minow, supra note 5, at 278-83.
193. Minow, supra note 5, at 276.
194. Id.
195. Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 576-80. Professor Woodhouse also
acknowledges that the efficiency, predictability, and certainty that comes with
bright line rules are legitimate goals, but that they should operate alongside
equitable mechanisms that operate post-hoc to mitigate damage done by bright
line rules.
196. For Barbara Woodhouse's parallel argument in the context of judicial
decision-making see id. at 576-81.
197. See, e.g., Note, Limits of the Functional Approach, supra note 5, at
1654-56 (recognizing that there is little consensus over what characteristics are
essential to adult consensual relationships; using as examples sexual intercourse
which may not be common, especially among older couples, and joint bank
accounts, which may or may not be considered evidence of a serious consensual
adult relationship).
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essential characteristics of adult consensual relationships. 198 Even
opponents of functional approaches tend to agree on these criteria.
99
Another problem related to the unpredictability and
manipulability that Professor Minow identifies is that using a
functional approach, rather than a formal, legal definition, will make
the system vulnerable to abuse."' In other words, the concern is that
such an approach will lead to "sham" family formations that are
structured only to take advantage of immigration benefits. The
suspicion of "sham" family formations may also lead to invasions of
privacy by authorities who are trying to determine if these are bona
fide family formations. The response here is again to consider the
alternative in the immigration context-functional families who wish
to immigrate together or remain together in the United States may
have to undergo scrutiny, but the alternative would be not to have
198. Id. at 1656. While courts acknowledge that the perceived needs of
children may vary from culture to culture, they find that there is a "minimum
threshold of care a parent must provide any child" that includes "a place to live,
clothing, an education, attention and medical care." Matter of the Appeal in
Cochise County, 133 Ariz. 157, 160, 650 P.2d 459, 462 (1982). Similar factors are
listed in at least one state statute which provides for a functional determination
of parenthood. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(10) (1990). To qualify as parents
under this statute, functional parents must have provided the child with "food,
clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries [including] necessary care, education
and discipline." Id. On the other hand, consensus may be difficult to reach over
questions such as: Are joint bank accounts indicative of a bona fide adult-adult
relationship? Is a sexual relationship necessary for a bona fide relationship?
199. Eliza Patten, The Subordination of Subsidized Guardianship in Child
Welfare Proceedings, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 237, 242 (2004) ("An
acknowledgment that multiple bonds are characteristic of most children's
emotional and social networks and are, in fact, beneficial, has replaced the
monotropic view."); Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Rethinking Visitation: From a Parental
to a Relational Right, 16 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 1, 16 (2009) ("The current
consensus on children's relational interests is that children can form multiple
relationships, which are essential for their social developmental needs.");
Kathryn Kendell, The Custody Challenge: Debunking Myths About Lesbian and
Gay Parents and Their Children, 20 Fam. Advoc. 21, 26 (1997) ("Every credible
research study demonstrates that sexual orientation is irrelevant to parental
ability and that children who have a close relationship with a lesbian or gay
parent will not suffer adversely."); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two
Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 Geo. L.J. 459, 464 (1990) (arguing that the
legal definition of parenthood should be expanded "to include anyone who
maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when a legally
recognized parent created that relationship with the intent that the relationship
be parental in nature").
200. Minow, supra note 5, at 277.
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the option altogether. If the United States adopts a functional
definition of "child" for the purposes of immigration, families will
have the choice (although an admittedly difficult one), to forego
government scrutiny and not make an application to immigrate
together. In other words, defining "child" to include functional
families opens up opportunities for families who may be willing to
undergo government scrutiny, but does not force this scrutiny on any
families who choose to opt out.
Because this Article advocates an approach that is focused on
children, some of the traditional concerns regarding functional family
definitions are less worrisome. A child-centered approach means
more predictability and less manipulation than an approach that
includes adult-adult relationships.2 ' A focus on the interests of
children makes the problems and risks inherent in a functional
approach worth accepting. As Professor Minow suggests in
ultimately supporting a functional approach that is grounded in the
interests of the child, children's interests "above all, are what must
take center stage. Neither the government's interests, nor the
interest of adults, justifies regulating otherwise private and intimate
concerns. The needs of vulnerable and developing children supply
that justification."20 2 While "to talk of children's interests hardly
simplifies matters,"2 3 the problems inherent in a functional approach
to defining family are worth confronting to advance the interests of
children.
IV. CONCLUSION
The UNHCR's Guidelines on Refugee children emphasize the
importance of family unity to the child's mental health.204 A child's
physical safety is also compromised by family separation.20 5 This is
why "[pireservation of family unity and preventing the separation of
201. See, e.g., Note, Limits of the Functional Approach, supra note 5, at
1654-55 (explaining the problems of using a functional approach to define adult-
adult relationships).
202. Minow, supra note 5, at 284.
203. Id.
204. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Refugee Children: Guidelines
on Protection and Care, 1994, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3470.html [hereinafter UNHCR
Refugee Children Guidelines].
205. Eliahu Frank Abram, The Child's Right to Family Unity in
International Immigration Law, 17 Law & Pol'y 397, 399 (1995).
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children from their parents or guardians is a peremptory mandate in
refugee assistance."2"6
There should be no confusion that the starting point in any
conversation regarding children's human rights should be the best
interests of children. We must begin to treat human rights, and
specifically children's human rights, in the same way we treat the
obligation of countries to protect the rights of their own citizens. The
United States must meet its moral imperative and modify its
immigration law in a way that recognizes the inalienable dignity of
children. Individual, cultural, and social interests underlie the
importance of a child's right to be raised by her family. These
interests are particularly strong when a child is at risk of being
separated from her parental figure. We accept this idea implicitly
when we are shocked by news reports of children who are in this
country without family to care for them. Unfortunately, this shock
fades, and these cases are often thought of as "exceptional cases" or
otherwise acceptable consequences of a necessary and inevitable
immigration policy.
20 7
As discussed throughout this Article, U.S. immigration law
should be guided by human rights principles. The argument here is
not that Congress is compelled by international law, at least as is
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, to do this, nor that the
Supreme Court should invalidate Congress' choices about defining
family as violative of the U.S. Constitution. The contention is that
there is a human rights aspect to the interests of children that
should outweigh the practical concerns discussed in this Article. In
short, the suggestion is that Congress should follow human rights
law in defining family in a way that is meaningful to children.
Like the Supreme Court, lower U.S. federal courts have
imported international law principles and international norms into
their opinions, despite their apparent refusal to grant the CRC the
status of customary international law.20 8 Isn't it time for us to follow
206. Id. See also UNHCR Refugee Children Guidelines, supra note 204, at
43, 93, 124.
207. BhaBha and Young explain, "[i]n any given case about children
seeking asylum, the principle will be one among several primary considerations
of concern to governments." BhaBha & Young, supra note 145, at 97. "Others may
include maintaining effective immigration control, preventing abuse of asylum
procedures, deterring smuggling networks, restricting the scope of the refugee
definition." Id.
208. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that Alvarez-Machain stated an actionable claim to recover
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the lead of these brave judges and join the rest of the world in an
effort to protect the rights of children?
damages for alleged violations of customary international law norms in
connection with his arrest in Mexico); Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp.2d 153,
234 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing the UDHR, ICCPR, and the CRC in support for the
claim that family integrity and privacy are fundamental rights, meriting
heightened scrutiny under the Constitution).
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